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Abstract 
 
 The U.S. Air Force seeks to measure and prioritize risk as part of its 
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA) process.  The goal of the CRRA is 
to identify capability shortfalls, and the risks associated with those shortfalls, to 
influence future systems acquisition.  Many fields, including engineering, medicine 
and finance, seek to model and measure risks.  This research utilizes various risk 
measurement approaches to propose appropriate risk measures for a military context.  
Specifically, risk is modeled as a non-negative random variable of severity.  Four 
measures are examined: simple expectation, a risk-value measure, tail conditional 
expectation, and distorted expectation.  Risk measures are subsequently used to 
weight the objective function coefficients in a system acquisition knapsack problem. 
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MEASURING THE RISK OF SHORTFALLS 
IN AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Issue Overview 
 In a continuing effort to prepare for future threats to United States security, the 
U.S. Air Force has implemented a new analytic planning tool, the Capabilities 
Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA).  This process, a top-down analysis of Air 
Force capability, is designed to guide service planning, requirements development and 
system acquisition.  The CRRA builds on six operational concepts to evaluate the 
value of specific Air Force programs to war-fighting effects.  According to the Air 
Force Chief of Staff, the ultimate goal of the CRRA is “an operational, capabilities-
based focus for acquisition program decision making” (Jumper, 2002). 
 There are six operational concepts that outline Air Force operations: 
• Global strike: gain and maintain access to the battle space 
• Space & C4ISR: integrate systems to provide information 
• Global response: attack high-value targets within hours 
• Homeland security: prevent, protect and respond to threats against U.S. 
territory 
• Nuclear response: provide a deterrent and prepare to use 
• Global mobility: project, employ and sustain U.S. power around the globe 
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 Based on these six concepts, the CRRA process identifies an exhaustive list of 
desired Air Force capabilities known as the “master capabilities library”.  These 
capabilities must be systematically reviewed to identify where the Air Force falls 
short in its desired capability.  Each capability shortfall can then be assessed for risk.  
Figure 1 shows the five, iterative steps of the CRRA process.  The steps involving risk 
assessment are the focus of this thesis. 
• Define top level 
capabilities • Identify capability shortfalls & 
trade-space • Refine scenarios
• Capability risk assessment  
• Strategic guidance • Develop options 
• Expectations 
• Review risk assessment • Integrated risk 
assessment • Refine options 
• Integrated options • Make decisions 
 
Figure 1. Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment Process 
 
 This research aims to provide a methodological basis for this risk assessment.  
The Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection laid out an 
appropriate goal for risk assessment that may also be relevant to the CRRA process.  
For the quantification of risk the Air Force needs “methodologies, tools and 
organizational processes” to handle “uncertainties in, or incomplete knowledge of, 
threats, vulnerabilities, and protection measures; and for managing risks across 
multiple components and organizations” (PCCIP, 1997:90).  The overarching question 
for this research, then, is how to prioritize risks when measuring Air Force capability 
shortfalls? 
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1.2. Background and Importance 
 Risk analysis is a diverse and growing field with a variety of opinions over its 
appropriate focus.  Broadly speaking, risk analysis breaks into two areas: physical risk 
studied by engineers and the medical community, and financial risk in investment 
management and the insurance industry.  There is little overlap between those who 
study risk measured in dollars and those who measure damage to equipment or loss of 
human life.  Two authors, from the latter community, minimize insurance and 
portfolio management as risk fields, arguing that “within the professional 
communities on risk, most analysts would agree that damage to human health and the 
environment are at the fore of what we call risk analysis and risk management” 
(Klinke and Renn, 2002:1076).  In addition, the study of risk has been largely separate 
from the study of choice within the academic research (Sarin and Weber, 1993:135). 
 The concept of risk can have multiple characteristics or qualities.  Investors 
typically imply volatility when using the term risk (Survey of Risk, 2004:9).  
Depending on the situation, risk may refer to the possible outcomes or consequences, 
likelihood of occurrence of those outcomes, the significance, causes or affected 
population (Ayyub, 2003:36).  The depth of risk assessment can vary greatly, 
depending on the available information and the level of detail required.  With little 
data, qualitative risk assessment may be the only possible analysis.  With more data 
available, a quantitative approach can be taken (Bennett et al., 1996:468). 
 In an effort to provide structure to risk analyses in the public sector, the 
National Research Council provides four questions for validation of a risk assessment 
(National Research Council, 2000:5). 
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• Are the generated measurements complete (collectively exhaustive) and useful 
to decision makers? 
• Are all relevant uncertainties accounted for? 
• Are these uncertainties correctly specified? 
• Are stochastic and statistical techniques properly implemented? 
These questions highlight the two most important components of risk: outcomes and 
likelihood.  The first of those components, the magnitude of the consequences, is a 
physical measure of severity in dollars lost, equipment damaged or human lives 
affected.  The second is a mathematical construct, the probability that something goes 
wrong (Haimes, 1998:41).  A common mathematical evaluation of risk is the product 
of these two factors, the likelihood of occurrence multiplied by the impact or severity 
of the consequence (Ayyub, 2003:37). 
 The current CRRA approach to risk involves two independent assessments for 
each identified capability.  First, the process determines the current level of capability 
based on a combination of assessments of proficiency and sufficiency.   The former is 
the quality of existing Air Force capability and the latter is the quantity of the existing 
capability.  These two measures are combined to form a single measure of existing 
capability, which ranges from none (0% capable) to complete (100% capable).  Second, 
Air Force subject matter experts are asked to identify the likely consequences if a 
scenario occurs that requires the capability, and no capability exists.  The estimated 
severity assessment ranges from “minor” to “catastrophic”.  These independent 
assessments of capability and expected severity are combined, using a contour plot to 
determine a risk score as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Existing CRRA risk methodology 
 
 There are three major factors this approach to risk assessment does not consider.  
First, the current level of a capability may have an effect on the outcome of a scenario.  
A higher capability with a mitigating effect, for example, would reduce the resulting 
severity.  Second, the methodology does not allow for the possibility that a capability 
will never be needed.  If a perceived threat does not materialize, an adverse event may 
never occur and no severity will be experienced, regardless of capability level.  
Finally, the existing approach does not include the range of possible severities.  
Estimating future severity involves both uncertain knowledge of threats and natural 
variability.  Without accounting for the affect of existing capability on risk, the 
possibility that a capability will never be needed, and the variability in outcomes 
capability shortfalls and redundancies may be incorrectly identified and prioritized. 
 This research proposes several ways that risk can be handled mathematically to 
overcome these challenges.  Borrowing from engineering, finance and actuarial 
science, this thesis models risk as a random variable with an associated probability 
distribution, rather than a single number.  This captures the notion that the future 
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severity of outcomes cannot be known with certainty.  This distribution can be 
adjusted based on judgments of how changes in capability affect risk.  Finally, using a 
variety of tools this risk distribution can be measured, summarized into a single 
number that allows risks to be ranked, prioritized or compared against each other. 
1.3. Scope and Limitations 
 The primary goal of this research is to determine a methodology that will assist 
Air Force decision makers to order or prioritize risks associated with shortfalls in 
capabilities.  Accurately ordering these risks will point senior Air Force leadership to 
the areas that require the most focus of future system acquisition or tactics 
development.  A secondary research goal is to explain approaches to risk from 
different fields, providing military analysts with an expanded toolbox for modeling 
and measuring risk.  Quantifying and measuring the downside risk of capability 
shortfalls requires projections of future needs and threats; this research suggests ways 
to add mathematical rigor to that process.  The final research goal is to determine an 
appropriate risk measure and apply it to a system acquisition problem for the optimal 
allocation of scarce resources. 
 There are several assumptions that form the foundation of this thesis.  First, 
while this research provides methodological recommendations to the CRRA, it uses 
only notional numerical data and does not provide any programmatic recommen-
dations.  Second, the proposed methodologies add mathematical rigor to the risk 
assessment portion of the CRRA, but still require subjective estimates of probabilities 
and severities of future events.  Third, this thesis considers only downside risk.  All 
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outcomes of capability shortfalls are assumed to be undesirable severities.  Upside or 
positive risk—the possibility that capability exceeds need—is not considered. 
 Using the proposed methodology, risks can be assessed at any level of the 
CRRA hierarchy of operational concepts, desired effects, general capabilities and 
specific tasks.  Risk modeling at a higher level probably means a less complicated 
result, but may mean additional analytic challenges.  Risk modeling lower in the 
hierarchy means a more complicated final product, but may be easier to assess. 
 This research focuses on the assessment of the risk associated with previously 
identified and quantified capability shortfalls.  It does not propose ways to quantify 
the current level of a capability or consider whether all capabilities have been 
correctly specified, emphasizing instead the prioritizing of risks associated with 
shortfalls already identified. 
 A general risk analysis process suggested by Haimes involves five distinct steps.  
First, risk identification involves specifying all the imaginable things that could go 
wrong, particularly noting possible failures in hardware, software, organization or 
humans.  Second, risk quantification and measurement requires objective or subjective 
assessment of the likelihood that the identified events will occur, including 
interactive and causal relationships.  Third, risk evaluation develops alternate courses 
of action with associated costs or tradeoffs.  Fourth, risk acceptance and avoidance 
means choosing between alternatives.  Finally, risk management implements the 
decision and provides feedback (Haimes, 1998:55-56). 
 This research focuses on the second and fourth steps in risk analysis: 
quantification, measurement and evaluation.  An overall methodology for the 
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prioritization of Air Force capability shortfall risks involves four steps, shown in 
Figure 3.  The first step, identifying capability level, the capabilities review portion of 
the CRRA process, takes place outside the scope of this research.  Quantifying 
likelihood and severity of adverse effects forms the second step.  This may involve an 
objective or subjective approach or some combination of the two.  Presumably 
intelligence will play a role in estimates of the likelihood of undesirable events and 
the severity of the consequences.  The identified level of friendly force capability 
should be considered in these quantitative estimates; a higher level of capability may 
make an event less likely to occur (prevention) or lessen the severity of the outcome 
(mitigation). 
 The third step of risk prioritization involves taking the distribution identified in 
step two and translating it into an appropriate measure or measures of risk.  The 
measure may use the expected or average severity, the variance or dispersion of the 
amount of severity or other relevant mathematical quantities.  This measure, a 
number rather than a probability distribution, can then be ordered with other 
measures in step four. 
Inputs
Capabilities Review • Intelligence • Avg severity • Dominance 
• Capability? • Variation • Preferences 
 
Figure 3. Capability Shortfall Risk Assessment 
 
Identify capability 
level 
Quantify 
likelihood and 
severity 
Calculate 
measure of risk 
Order measures 
of risk 
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1.4. Thesis Organization 
 The remainder of this thesis describes methodologies for the mathematical 
modeling and measurement of risk in the risk assessment phase of the Capabilities 
Review and Risk Assessment process.  Chapter II provides an overview of the 
academic literature, including a discussion of the causes and remedies for uncertainty, 
and an explanation of a variety of risk analysis techniques that may be useful in the 
assessment risk in a military context.  Chapter III explains the factors involved in 
modeling capability shortfall risk and offers four mathematical risk measures for 
summarizing risks in a single quantity.  Chapter IV examines a set of notional risks 
based on nine high-level capabilities and shows how risk measures can be used to 
guide system acquisition decisions.  Finally, Chapter V summarizes the results of this 
research and suggests questions for future study. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Overview of Risk Analysis 
 Risk analysis plays a prominent role in a number of disciplines, including 
engineering, decision analysis, statistics, medicine, financial management and 
actuarial science.  While the exact approaches applied to risk vary, some common 
themes emerge.  In general, risk includes some aspect of uncertainty and some aspect 
of negative consequences.  The first goal of risk analysis is to understand—and 
perhaps reduce—the uncertainty.  The second is to understand—and perhaps 
prevent—the negative outcomes. 
 There is some disagreement in the academic literature over both aspects of risk.  
Some analysts claim that a deterministic situation, one with complete certainty, 
cannot be considered risky.  The past, for example, has no risk because all of its 
uncertainties have been resolved, and risk can only belong to the future 
(Ayyub, 2003:35).  Others describe any situation with a downside or negative outcome 
as a risk, even if that negative outcome is certain (Fishburn, 1984:397).  The Defense 
Department defines risk as the “probability and severity of loss linked to hazards” 
(Department of Defense, 2003:459). 
 While risk commonly implies negative outcomes, some analysts also use the 
term risk to include positive outcomes as well.  This is particularly true in the 
financial management field, where an investment can have a positive or negative 
return (Jia and Dyer, 1996:1692).  In other contexts, risk is only used to describe 
negative outcomes and does not refer to success (Ayyub, 2003:35).  The Capabilities 
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Review and Risk Assessment process focuses on the negative side of risk only and has 
defined risk as “the impact on combat operations if … capability is not available to 
provide the required effects” (AFSAA, 2003:35).  The CRRA definition of risk does 
not include any reference to probability, but does not explicitly exclude probability 
either. 
 For this research, risk will be considered to include any situation with negative 
consequences, with an emphasis—but not a restriction—on the uncertainty associated 
with those consequences. 
 Risk analysts break the process of studying risk into two phases: risk assessment 
and risk management.  Risk assessment seeks to gain an understanding of the factors, 
outcomes and parameters of the search for answers to three questions 
(Haimes, 1998:55). 
• What can go wrong? 
• What is the likelihood of it going wrong? 
• What are the consequences? 
Risk management seeks to reduce or control risk.  Like risk assessment, it has three 
broad questions (Haimes, 1998:55). 
• What options are available? 
• What are the costs and benefits? 
• What is the future impact? 
2.2. Uncertainty 
 This section describes the causes of uncertainty and some existing approaches to 
describe uncertainty in verbal and mathematical terms.  Risk, though related to 
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uncertainty, is not quite the same thing.  Where uncertainty can include any absence 
of knowledge, risk is more an “educated gamble” (Survey of Risk, 2004:4). 
2.2.1. Causes of Uncertainty 
 Uncertainty can occur for an array of reasons.  This section describes some of 
these reasons, and explains the distinction between uncertainty caused by a lack of 
knowledge and uncertainty due to natural variability.  It then includes a brief 
overview of game theory, a mathematical approach for understanding uncertainty 
caused by intelligent opposition. 
2.2.1.1. Categorizing Uncertainty 
 Historically, the term “uncertainty” was used to describe situations for which 
probability distributions could not be used because of insufficient data.  The National 
Research Council no longer finds this an acceptable definition in the analysis of risk, 
favoring uncertainty as a more general word to describe any situation in which 
outcomes are not fully known (National Research Council, 2000:41). 
 Uncertainty can take many forms, but in general it can be broken into three 
broad categories: natural variability, knowledge uncertainty and decision model 
uncertainty (National Research Council, 2000:48).  Natural variability (also called 
aleatory, external, objective, random or stochastic uncertainty) refers to the inherent 
instability in the physical and human world, the understanding that the same process 
will not play out the same way every time.   Knowledge uncertainty (also called 
epistemic, functional, internal or subjective uncertainty) refers to the imprecision of 
our understanding of a system (National Research Council, 2000:42). 
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 Knowledge uncertainty affects calculations in a different way from natural 
variability (National Research Council, 2000:6).  For example, soliciting expert 
opinion may measure variability but still leaves uncertainty (Kelly and 
Taylor, 2003:495).  Uncertainty about data contributes to knowledge uncertainty.  
Data uncertainty comes from measurement or transcription errors, sampling that is 
not representative of the entire population, or a system that is inconsistent or 
heterogeneous in time or space (National Research Council, 2000:44). 
 The final category of uncertainty is the decision model.  The decision maker 
may have poorly defined or continuously changing objectives or values which prevent 
consistent decisions (National Research Council, 2000:42).  When the model is 
uncertain, even complete knowledge and zero natural variability are insufficient for 
correct insight into the system in question. 
2.2.1.2. Uncertainty from an Intelligent Opponent 
 In a traditional analysis of reliability, engineers assume negative effects follow 
some probability distribution based solely on the design specifications of the system.  
Building a more robust system, with stronger parts or redundant components, 
improves reliability, the probability that the system will continue to function through 
some time period.  In a military context, where damage may occur because of enemy 
attack instead of random accident, new analyses are necessary.  Game theory, which 
requires decisions against an intelligent opponent, can help to bridge the gap between 
classical probability theory and a world that faces threats from enemies intent on 
destruction. 
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 When a threat is natural, the analyst can build a probability distribution of risk 
on the design of the system in question.  When a threat comes from an intelligent 
source such as an enemy military, however, the probability distribution associated 
with risk can change over time. 
 Non-state enemies, such as terrorists, add additional complexity.  In some 
sense, terrorists threaten in illogical and unpredictable ways, because no obvious 
procedure exists to test for the appropriate safety factor (Smith, 2002:40).  However, 
the management of risk requires the same kinds of tradeoff between cost and 
productivity whether the system faces an intelligent threat or a random one 
(Smith, 2002:41). 
 Two papers from the journal Military Operations Research describe ways to 
incorporate a game theoretic model into a risk analysis of military systems.  In a 2002 
paper, “Risk Management and the Value of Information in a Defense Computer 
System,” Hamill et al. provide a model of threats and protections to an information 
system.  Paté-Cornell and Guikema (2002), in “Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist 
Threats: A Systems Analysis to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures,” explain 
how to separate beliefs from actual capabilities in a model and how to handle learning 
by both terrorists and those defending against them. 
 Hamill et al. (2002) define risk assessment as the linkage among three factors: 
threat, vulnerability and impact.  Natural or accidental human threats can be modeled 
with a classical probability approach.  That leaves threats that are not accidental, but 
intended attacks (Hamill et al., 2002:64).  These intentional human threats can be 
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modeled with a game-theoretic method to account for possibility that the threat can 
change—in a rational manner—depending on the defenses set up. 
 Two approaches allow the defender to identify the payouts and probabilities in 
the game.  The Red Team “hacker approach” to vulnerability assessment involves 
putting together a team that attempts to break the system.  This is equivalent to 
playing the game multiple times to see if equilibrium can be reached.  The advantage 
of this approach is that it most closely models reality, with actual human decision 
makers seeking their optimal strategy (Hamill et al., 2002:65).  At each iteration the 
damage to the system (whether sensitive information acquired by the attacker or data 
destroyed) can be measured, along with the ease or speed with which the attacker 
gained access.  These attacks can be paired with the defensive measures employed to 
build the two strategy vectors and associated payoff matrix for insight into the risk of 
damage to the system. 
 An alternative approach to vulnerability assessment is the “algorithmic 
approach,” which is a “methodical and systematic evaluation” of the system.  The 
advantage of the algorithmic approach is that it may identify threats that the 
unsystematic hacker approach does not happen to explore (Hamill et al., 2002:65).  
This is equivalent to attempting to completely identify strategies and payoffs and 
solve the game theoretically.  In practice, a combination of both hacker and 
algorithmic approaches will generally lead to the greatest understanding of the game 
parameters. 
 In another application of game theory to risk analysis, the Paté-Cornell article 
focuses on building an “overarching model,” focused on model structure rather than 
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numbers, to collect information from different sources on threats, potential enemies, 
possible damage and targets.  The game theory aspect of terrorism and counterter-
rorism comes from its dynamic nature as each side updates priorities with the other 
side’s changes (Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002:5-7). 
 One of the greatest difficulties in analyzing risk in a game theory setting is the 
sheer number of possibilities.  The places and ways an enemy can attack are 
enormous.  When combined with the number of ways to deter or mitigate damage, 
the problem—at least at the strategic level—is unmanageable.  The authors propose a 
model that attempts to cut through some of the problems with size by combining 
possible outcomes.  They suggest that every event or severity random variable (risk) 
in their model can be analyzed at a more detailed level if desired (Paté-Cornell and 
Guikema, 2002:5). 
 As with Hamill’s approach, Paté-Cornell assumes that the model of enemy 
strategy requires separate assessments of capability and motive.  When modeling 
multiple enemies (for example, different terrorist groups), each enemy may have a 
different combination of these two factors (Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002:7).  This 
does not necessarily mean that n-person game solution methodologies are required, 
however.  Because the defender is not (presumably) forming coalitions with some 
terrorist groups against others, these are a set of two-person games rather than a 
single n-person one.  Either all attackers can be lumped together as a single opponent, 
accounting for any synergies the various attackers gain from each other, or defending 
against each opponent can be considered a separate game. 
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 Clearly, the actual employment of game theory in the assessment of risk is 
difficult.  The number of strategies available to a potential attacker is immense, and 
the number of strategies to deter or mitigate risk is also large. 
2.2.2. Quantification of Uncertainty 
 In understanding and modeling risk, uncertainty must be translated into 
probability.  In well-defined, well-understood situations, probabilities can be 
determined directly.  For example, it is clear and widely-understood that a fair coin 
has probability 0.5 of landing heads and probability 0.5 of landing tails.  In other, less 
intuitive situations, probabilities can be estimated based on empirical data.  When 
historical data is available for risks, objective probabilities can be estimated.  
Typically, however, sparse historical databases lead away from objective probabilities 
in risk assessment to subjective probabilities based on expert judgment 
(Haimes, 1998:138).  This section describes approaches and methods to determine 
these subjective probability estimates. 
 In the context of risk, there can be uncertainty in both outcomes and 
probabilities of those outcomes.  Decision makers may find it helpful to break their 
problem into four classes: probabilities and outcomes known, probabilities uncertain 
and outcomes known, probabilities known and outcomes uncertain, or both 
probabilities and outcomes uncertain.  (Langewisch and Choobineh, 1996:140) 
 A linear mathematical program involves an objective function to maximize or 
minimize subject to a set of linear constraints defining a set of feasible solutions.  In 
the standard form of this model all parameters must be known.  Eum, Park and Kim 
(2001) provide a set of linear programming tools to handle simultaneous uncertainty 
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about weighting and value scoring in a multi-criteria decision analysis.  The authors 
suggest several conditions, besides exact estimates, that can be used to define 
weighting and value scoring (Eum et al., 2001:399).  Based on whether weighting, 
value scoring or both weights and values are uncertain, the authors show how a linear 
programming model can identify dominated and potentially optimal alternatives 
(Eum et al., 2001:405).  This tool could be used for prioritizing risks when relatively 
little is known about the likelihood of various outcomes. 
 It is possible to distinguish between decision making “under partial informa-
tion” and the sensitivity of a decision.  The former involves imprecisely specified 
weights.  The latter includes exact weights but a decision maker uncertain about 
which factors are important and interested in refining those original “exact” 
estimates.  Even if a decision is robust in its parameters, sensitivity analysis is 
invaluable in helping the decision maker understand the problem (Rios Insua and 
French, 1991:177).  Some other authors suggest a Bayesian approach to handle 
uncertain parameters.  However, when parameters are considered as random variables 
with probability distributions, there may be more imprecision from the new 
distributions than additional benefit to the model.  An iterative process of the 
decision maker making judgments and the analyst performing sensitivity analysis 
may be a more appropriate approach (Rios Insua and French, 1991:180). 
 Choobineh and Behrens (1992) caution against assuming too much about the 
underlying probability distribution of a random variable.  One alternative to fitting a 
theoretical probability distribution is to use an interval distribution.  An interval 
distribution makes no assumption about the probabilities of any outcome other than 
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to place upper and lower bounds.  An alternative to the interval distribution is a 
possibility distribution.  Possibility distributions essentially take multiple intervals, 
rather than a single interval, to allow for a gradual decrease in possibility (Choobineh 
and Behrens, 1992:910).  Figure 4 shows an interval distribution, where a parameter is 
equally likely to take on any value within the range, and a possibility distribution, 
where the parameter has the same expected value as the interval distribution, but is 
less likely to take on values at the extremes. 
Parameter Value
P
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Interval distribution Possibility distribution
 
Figure 4. Interval and Possibility Distribution (Choobineh and Behrens, 1992:910) 
 
 A final approach to the quantification of uncertainty is the translation of 
subjective, verbal expressions of likelihood into numerical probabilities.  There is 
large disagreement over what is meant by, for example, an infrequently occurring 
event.  For any verbal to numeric translation, the only consistency is that “unlikely” 
means less than 0.5 probability and “likely” means greater than 0.5.  The context of 
the verbal description has a large effect on the numerical translations.  In a situation 
in which negative consequences occur very infrequently, a high probability may still 
be much closer to zero than to one. 
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 Table 1 shows three verbal-numeric translation schemes.  In the first, sixteen 
risk managers were surveyed for their interpretation of different phrases describing 
likelihood (Jablonowski, 1994:52).  The average response of the sixteen individuals is 
shown, along with the range of their responses.  The ranges overlap, except for the 
gap between “somewhat likely” and “likely”. 
 The second set of verbal-numeric translations comes from an engineering 
setting, with a failure rate describing the occurrence of system failure per cycle or per 
unit of time (Ayyub, 2003:61).  Because system failure is a rare event, these 
probabilities are much closer to 0 than to 1, with “high” occurrence, for example, 
equivalent to probabilities of 0.025 to 0.05. 
 The third set of translations comes from a military regulation (MIL-STD-
1629A, 1980:section 3.1).  These translations are also intended for engineers, but are 
expressed independent of time, as simply the probability of system failure. 
 
Table 1. Verbal to Numeric Probability Translations 
Description Average Range  Occurrence Failure Rate  Description Prob of Failure 
Rare .05 .01-.15  Minor <1 in 1,000,000  Extremely unlikely 0.001 
Very unlikely .10 .03-.25  Low 1 in 20,000 to 1 in 4000 Remote 0.001-0.01 
Unlikely .19 .09-.30  Moderate 1 in 1000 to 1 in 80  Occasional 0.01-0.10 
Somewhat unlikely .26 .09-.45  High 1 in 40 to 1 in 20  Probably 0.10-0.20 
Likely .77 .52-.98  Extreme 1 in 8 to 1 in 2  Frequent >0.20 
Frequent .78 .60-.90       
Extremely likely .93 .85-.99       
 
2.2.3. Probability Distribution Tails 
 Sparse data in the extreme values of a probability distribution can make fitting a 
correct distribution a difficult task.  In some cases having a small amount of data can 
be particularly dangerous since it results in too confidently fitting a distribution that 
2-11 
 
does not accurately represent the true distribution.  Even when a distribution is fit 
using a significant amount of data it should be subjected to sensitivity analysis of its 
parameters (Bratley et al., 1987:125). 
 When a lack of data in the tail of a distribution does not allow a theoretical 
distribution to be fit, an exponential tail is a reasonable approximation.  This can be 
adjusted in sensitivity analysis with various Weibull distributions (Bratley 
et al., 1987:133). 
 Alternatively, the distribution tail can be fit using the statistics of extremes, 
which is the mathematical study of the largest (or smallest) values a random variable 
can assume.  The statistics of extremes identifies three forms of probability 
distribution tails, depending on the type of data.  A Gumbel distribution, with 
cumulative distribution function H(x) = exp(-e-x), allows tails in both the positive and 
negative domains.  The exponential, lognormal and normal distributions all fall into 
the Gumbel family.  A Weibull form only works when the domain of the random 
variable is negative and has cumulative distribution function of the form 
H(x) = exp[−(−x)γ].  Uniform and triangular distributions follow this Weibull form.  
The final tail distribution is the Frechet approximation with cumulative distribution 
function H(x) = exp(−x-γ).  The Frechet form can only be used when the domain is 
positive.  The Pareto distribution is an example of a distribution that falls in the 
Frechet family (Lambert et al., 1994:734). 
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2.3. Existing Approaches to Risk Modeling 
 A great deal of the risk analysis literature deals with specific techniques for risk 
assessment and mitigation in mechanical or biological systems.  Some of the 
approaches are more general, however, and may be useful in a military context.  This 
section overviews these risk approaches, providing a basic definition of the technique, 
the context in which it has been used, the inputs required to implement as well as the 
outputs generated, and some of the advantages and disadvantages relative to other 
tools. 
2.3.1. Engineering Approaches to Risk 
 Engineering risk analysis focuses broadly on breaking complex systems into 
more easily understood parts.  The most general of these approaches is reliability 
assessment.  Other tools or techniques used by engineers to assess risk include 
hierarchical holographic modeling, which emphasizes the different perspectives 
experts bring to an analysis, the partitioned multiobjective risk method, which 
simplifies a risk distribution into multiple risk measures, and impact intensity, which 
multiplies different risk factors into a single number. 
2.3.1.1. Reliability Assessment 
 In the engineering community, reliability is a major field of risk analysis.  The 
study of reliability involves the analysis of complex systems to identify their chance 
of failure over time.  In general, reliability analysis focuses on breaking a system into 
smaller components which are more easily understood. 
 Several concepts are available to express system reliability quantitatively.  
Reliability itself is generally modeled as a function of time.  The function value is the 
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probability a system continues to work, under specified conditions, for a specified 
period of time (Ebeling, 1997:5).  This function, the complement to a cumulative 
distribution function, is called the survival function denoted by S(t). 
 Reliability is often expressed as the mean time to failure (MTTF) or mean time 
between failures (MTBF), numbers which are calculated as the average of the 
survival function.  For instance, the mean time to failure is 
 MTTF = . ∫
∞
0
)( dttS (1)
 Other reliability measures include maintainability, where systems are analyzed 
for both their time to failure and the subsequent time for repair, and availability, the 
proportion of time a system is working in the long run (Ebeling, 1997:6). 
 Several tools are available to help an engineer identify and quantify the possible 
failure of a complex system.  Preliminary hazards analysis is a first step in reliability 
assessment.  This is a non-mathematical approach to identify the elements of a 
system or events in a process where something could go wrong (Henley and 
Kumamoto, 1981:21).  A more detailed, systematic approach is failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA).  This is an iterative, bottom-up process to identify the ways 
(modes) a system can fail, explaining the causes and quantifying the probabilities of 
occurrence (Ebeling, 1997:167).  FMEA is widely-used and well-accepted in the 
engineering community.  The primary disadvantage of this approach is its tendency 
to ignore combinations of problems that together lead to failure, even though 
independently they are not dangerous (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981:40). 
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 Fault tree analysis is a graphical view of the ways and causes of system failure.  
Figure 5 shows an example fault tree.  Where FMEA starts at the lowest possible 
component level of a system to analyze reliability, fault tree analysis is a top-down 
approach that focuses on events rather than system components.  The top event in the 
tree is the event of the overall failure of the system.  The tree then breaks down this 
overall failure into all the possible resultant events that cause the overall failure.  A 
series of logical AND and OR “gates” are used to show when all resultant events are 
required for a top event or if a single resultant event is sufficient.  At the bottom level 
of the tree are “basic events” which are not analyzed in further detail.  When these 
basic events have probabilities attached to them, the overall system failure probability 
can be calculated. 
  
Figure 5. Fault Tree 
 
 The advantage of a fault tree approach is its flexibility in level of detail.  
Component or system failures may be decomposed into extremely precise, detailed 
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events, or kept at a simple level.  Unfortunately, this means that fault trees can grow 
large and complex very quickly.  Because they do not (necessarily) visually match the 
system or process, even individuals familiar with the system may have difficulty 
following them (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981:40). 
 Criticality analysis is a quantitative tool to prioritize system components based 
on their relative importance to the overall system.  After a failure mode and effect 
analysis has identified all of the ways (modes) a system can fail, a criticality index 
number can be calculated for each component as the product of three factors: the 
conditional probability of damage given a particular failure mode occurs, the rate of 
occurrence of the particular failure mode and the time period being analyzed.  
Summing over all failure modes affecting the component in question results in an 
index number for ranking component criticality (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981:34; 
Ebeling, 1997:170). 
2.3.1.2. Hierarchical Holographic Modeling 
 Hierarchical holographic modeling is a tool to identify risks in large-scale, 
complex systems.  The goal of the method is to take advantage of multiple expert 
views of the system in order to provide different perspectives on the vulnerabilities 
and hazards in the system.  The approach requires examining the overall system from 
different, overlapping perspectives: time, economics, geographical, legal, and 
environmental, for example (Haimes, 1998:98).  Hierarchical holographic modeling 
has been used to identify risks in energy utilities, water resource systems, sustainable 
development projects and system acquisition (Haimes, 1998:99-108). 
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 To identify risks, a hierarchical structure of factors based on the different 
perspectives under consideration must be built.  Experts can then provide subjective 
input at the different levels of the hierarchy where they have expertise.  Sparse 
historical databases lead away from objective probabilities in risk assessment to 
subjective probabilities based on expert judgment (Haimes, 1998:138).  The primary 
advantage of this modeling technique is that it allows expert opinions to overlap; the 
elements of the hierarchy do not have to be mutually exclusive (Haimes, 1998:95). 
2.3.1.3. Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method 
 The partitioned multiobjective risk method (PMRM) splits the risk distribution 
into two or more sections and calculates the conditional expectation, given that 
severity falls with each of these sections.  In addition, the overall expected severity is 
calculated.  This results in at least three numbers, which serve as measures of the risk.  
The method is used for multiobjective risk analysis problems, and each of the 
conditional expectations, plus the overall expectation, are used as quantities in a 
multiobjective decision framework (Haimes, 1998:312). 
 Partitioning is a subjective exercise and there is no general rule for selecting the 
points at which to split.  Partitioning can be done on the severity axis or the 
probability axis.  That is, the n partitions can be defined by severities βi such that 0 < 
β1 ≤ β2 ≤ … ≤ βn-1 ≤ ∞.  Alternatively, the n partitions can be defined by probabilities 
αi such that 0 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ … ≤ αn-1 ≤ 1 (Haimes, 1998:315). 
 PMRM requires the entire risk distribution to be known, but takes advantage of 
that knowledge by calculating measures over the entire distribution.  By calculating 
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multiple measures, the method retains information lost in other techniques that do 
more simplification.  The disadvantage of this is that multiple measures do not allow 
risks to be easily ranked. 
2.3.1.4. Impact Intensity 
 The basic concept of impact intensity is to identify a number of risk factors 
such as likelihood of occurrence, expected severity, chance of detection or expense of 
mitigation, and assign an index value to each of these factors.  This models risk as an 
n-dimensional vector.  An “impact intensity” or “risk prioritization number” can then 
be calculated in several ways using the values in this vector. 
 The first formulation is the linear multi-attribute value function where each 
factor receives a score between 0 (low risk) and 1 (high risk) and a relative weight 
(Cho et al., 1997:26). 
 Impact Intensity =  ∑
=
n
i
iivalueweight
1
(2)
Alternatively, impact intensity can be calculated as a multiplicative function that 
results in a maximum score when any single factor is at its maximum, similar to the 
calculation of reliability in a parallel components system (Cho et al., 1997:27). 
 Impact Intensity =  ( )∏
=
−−
n
i
weight
i
ivalue
1
11 (3)
A simpler impact intensity function involves multiplying the factor scores together, a 
calculation like the system reliability of components in series (Ayyub, 2003:62). 
 Impact Intensity = ∏  
=
n
i
ivalue
1
(4)
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 Table 2 shows an example of the three impact intensity functions with four risk 
factors scored at low (0.0), medium (0.5) and high (1.0) and all factors are equally 
weighted.  Under Equation (3) when any factor scores a one, the impact intensity is 
one.  With Equation (4), when any factor scores a zero, the impact intensity is zero. 
 
Table 2. Example of Impact Intensities 
Factor Scores Eq (2) Eq (3) Eq (4) 
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5) 0.25 0.50 0.00 
(0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 0.5) 0.35 0.75 0.00 
(0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) 0.43 0.88 0.00 
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0) 0.50 1.00 0.00 
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) 0.50 0.94 0.06 
(0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0) 0.56 1.00 0.00 
(0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 1.0) 0.61 1.00 0.00 
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1.0) 0.66 1.00 0.13 
(0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0) 0.71 1.00 0.00 
(0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.0) 0.75 1.00 0.00 
(0.5, 0.5, 1.0, 1.0) 0.79 1.00 0.25 
(0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0) 0.87 1.00 0.00 
(0.5, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0) 0.90 1.00 0.50 
(1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 Impact intensity offers the advantage of summarizing risk in a single number, 
but allowing components of that risk to be easily highlighted.  A risk can be 
considered critical if it has a high overall score or if any single component score is 
above some threshold.  Risks with impact intensities are easily ranked, because the 
technique reduces the complexity of multi-dimensional risk to a single number. 
 The method does not, however, allow or account for any variability.  All scores 
are deterministic.  Depending on the equation selected to calculate intensity, the 
result might inappropriately focus on a risk with a high single component score that is 
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not really dangerous overall, or ignore a truly important risk with moderate 
component scores that combine to a low score overall. 
2.3.1.5. Farmer Curve 
 The Farmer curve is a graphical tool to display tradeoffs in risk and indicate risk 
acceptance.  Risk acceptance is an acknowledgement of the existence of the possibility 
of adverse effects and a willingness to live with the situation.  It was originally 
employed to explain the risk of radioactive release from nuclear power plants (Henley 
and Kumamoto, 1981:13). 
 The curve, shown in Figure 6, plots frequency versus severity.  The curve is the 
maximum acceptable level of risk.  Scenarios that are more likely or more severe than 
the curve are deemed unacceptable risks.  That is, points above or to the right of the 
curve are unacceptable.  Points below or left of the curve, representing less likely or 
less severe scenarios, are classified as acceptable risks and do not require mitigating 
resources. 
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Figure 6. Farmer Curve 
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2.3.1.6. Precautionary Principle 
 The precautionary principle comes out of the field of toxicology and essentially 
states that no level of risk is acceptable.  If there is any chance that a substance will 
cause damage to human beings or the environment, efforts should be taken to 
completely eliminate its release (Klinke and Renn, 2002:1071). 
 Because no risk is deemed acceptable under the precautionary principle, only 
two factors need to be considered: the most catastrophic possible outcome and the cost 
of risk management.  Decision makers should seek the biggest bang for the buck in 
risk mitigation.  Two principles used in practice are “as low as reasonable” and “best 
available control technology” (Klinke and Renn, 2002:1071). 
 The precautionary principle has an advantage of simplicity, since it does not 
require detailed assessment of possible outcomes or likelihoods attached to particular 
severities.  Unfortunately, it is often unrealistic to completely eliminate risk and 
ignoring the probability distribution associated with various outcomes may result in a 
poor allocation of resources. 
2.3.2. Decision Analysis Tools 
 Decision analysis is concerned with selection between multiple competing 
alternatives.  Multiple criteria, as well as multiple alternatives may be part of the 
problem.  In a risk assessment situation, the different risks can be considered the 
alternatives, and the decision tools could help in the ranking or prioritization of these 
risks. 
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2.3.2.1. Non-Parametric Decision Rules 
 When probabilities are completely inestimable, Fleischer suggests that five 
different decision rules are available to rank alternatives.  Although these rules do not 
require quantification of likelihood, there still must be analysis of all possible 
alternatives and outcomes.  Each of these rules will not necessarily give the same 
answer, but they will help frame the decision (Fleischer, 1984:292). 
 The minimax rule is the extreme pessimistic approach that assumes the worst 
possible outcome will happen.  Among all alternatives, select the one with the best 
(minimum) of the worst (maximum) possible costs.  If the problem is concerned with 
gains rather than losses, the equivalent rule is maximin, that is, selection of the 
alternative with the best (maximum) of the worst (minimum) possible profit 
(Fleischer, 1984:286). 
 The minimin rule is the opposite approach to minimax, taking instead an extreme 
optimistic approach that assumes the best possible outcome will happen.  Among all 
alternatives, select the one with the best (minimum) of the best (minimum) possible 
costs.  Again, if the problem is measured in gains instead of losses, the rule is 
maximax, selection of the alternative with the highest possible profit 
(Fleischer, 1984:287). 
 The Hurwicz rule takes a middle ground between extreme optimism and 
extreme pessimism.  This rule, named after econometrician Leonid Hurwicz, involves 
a linear combination of the best and worst possible outcomes for each alternative.  
Multiply the worst possible outcome by the “index of optimism,” a number α 
between 0 and 1, and multiply the best possible outcome by (1 – α).  The sum of these 
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two numbers can be compared across alternatives.  If α=0, the Hurwicz rule is 
equivalent to minimax and if α=1 it is equivalent to minimin (Fleischer, 1984:288). 
 The Laplace rule, named after mathematician Pierre Simon de Laplace, assumes 
that all outcomes are equally likely.  The rule says to calculate the expected value of 
these equally likely outcomes, and select the alternative with the best expected value 
(Fleischer, 1984:288). 
 The Savage rule, also known as the principle of minimax regret, seeks to minimize 
the difference between the actual outcome and the outcome if the future had been 
correctly forecasted.  This difference is the decision maker’s “regret.”  In order to 
apply the Savage rule, named after statistician L.J. Savage, calculate a regret matrix, 
where each row is a different alternative and each column is a different “state of 
nature.”  Each entry in the matrix is the difference between the outcome of that 
combination of alternative and state and the best possible outcome in that state of 
nature.  Select the alternative with the smallest maximum regret value.  The most 
significant disadvantage of the Savage rule is that adding an additional alternative can 
shift the answer, even if the new alternative is not preferred (Fleischer, 1984:291). 
2.3.2.2. Lexicographic Method 
 The lexicographic method is a technique to rank different alternatives under 
multiple criteria.  In the context of risk, criteria could be the worst possible outcome, 
a chance of any adverse event occurring or the most likely outcome.  The decision 
maker first ranks all of the attributes from most important to least important.  Each 
alternative is then scored for the most important attribute.  Alternatives that meet 
some acceptability threshold according to the most important attribute are then 
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scored for the next most important attribute.  This process continues until only one 
alternative remains, or the alternatives have been scored for every attribute and a set 
of possible solutions remains (Chankong and Haimes, 1983:200). 
 The primary advantage of this approach is its cognitive simplicity.  It does not 
require that every alternative be scored for every criterion and it does not require a 
precise score for each alternative, only a decision on whether the acceptability 
threshold has been met.  In addition, the lexicographic method closely relates to the 
way individuals make decisions in practice, focusing on the single most important 
attribute to screen alternatives rather than examining all alternatives with all 
attributes simultaneously (Chankong and Haimes, 1983:200).  The primary 
disadvantage of the lexicographic method is its emphasis on ranking the attributes.  
An alternative that scores low in the single most important attribute but is superior in 
every other category may be eliminated even though it is important (Chankong and 
Haimes, 1983:205). 
2.3.2.3. ELECTRE Method 
 The ELECTRE method is a tool for multiobjective decisions where the number 
of alternatives is relatively small and the value of each alternative is known with 
certainty.  According to Chankong and Haimes, the method was first proposed by 
Bernard Roy in 1968.  The method can result in a preferred alternative, or a preferred 
class of alternatives.  To implement the technique each alternative is compared to the 
others and assigned an “outranking” relation, specifying that one alternative is 
preferred to another.  These relationships can be displayed in a directed graph 
(Chankong and Haimes, 1983:205-6). 
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 ELECTRE does not require that every set of alternatives be comparable, though 
every comparison and outranking relation adds strength to the assessment (Chankong 
and Haimes, 1983:208).  The primary disadvantage of the ELECTRE method is its 
requirement of certainty in outcomes. 
2.3.3. Risk Measurement 
 The purpose of quantifying risk and simplifying that quantification in a risk 
measure is to order different risks and, ultimately, to choose between them.  The 
quantification requires the probability distributions of the risk and the risk measure 
requires a preference function for those distributions (Landsman and 
Sherris, 2001:103).  Increasing risk can mean one of two things: that bad outcomes are 
becoming more likely or that likely outcomes are getting worse (Fishburn, 1984:397).  
Risk measurement seeks to combine both of these aspects into a single number. 
2.3.3.1. Need for Risk Measures 
 In the simplest case one risk stochastically dominates another and specific 
probability distributions of risks need not be known in order to rank risks.  Under the 
risk-return dominance property, a gamble with a higher (expected) value and a lower 
risk will always be preferred (Sarin and Weber, 1993:136). 
 The simplest measure of risk (to understand) is the expected severity.  There is 
significant danger of conflating events with high probability of occurrence and low 
cost with events of low probability of occurrence and high cost through simple 
expected value comparisons because the catastrophic outcomes that could occur may 
be too high to bear no matter how small the probability (Haimes, 1998:17). 
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2.3.3.2. Properties of Risk Measures 
 Several authors identify a list of properties or attributes that should be 
considered when selecting a risk measure.  Sarin and Weber argue that a risk measure 
should increase when the range or variance of severity increases, when a constant is 
added to all severity outcomes, when outcomes are multiplied by a constant greater 
than 1 or when a gamble is repeated multiple times (Sarin and Weber, 1993:138). 
 Landsman and Sherris proposes four properties of risk measures: risk aversion, 
diversification, additivity and consistency.  The risk aversion property means that a 
risk measure will be greater than or equal to the expected value.  Under risk-
neutrality the risk measure is the expectation.  The diversification property means 
that multiple small risks should be preferred to a single large risk.  The additive 
property means that a risk measure of the sum of risks is equal to the sum of risk 
measures.  Finally, consistency applies to risks with positive and negative outcomes 
and implies that if one risk (of loss) is preferred to another, equivalent gains should 
have the same preference ordering (Landsman and Sherris, 2001:105). 
 In a 1999 paper regularly cited in the literature, Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and 
Heath, outline four desirable characteristics of a risk measure.  When a risk measure 
meets these four axioms, it is considered a “coherent” risk measure (Artzner 
et al., 1999:210). 
 The first property of coherence is translation invariance, which means that any 
constant added to a risk changes the risk measure by a corresponding amount 
(Artzner et al., 1999:209).  Expectation, for example, has translation invariance since 
for any random variable X and constant α. 
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 E[X + α] = E[X] + α. (5)
Variance, on the other hand, does not have the translation invariance property since 
 Var[X + α] = Var[X]. (6)
Any risk measure then that includes variance, or a function of variance like standard 
deviation, cannot be a coherent risk measure.  Figure 7 shows the probability density 
functions of two risks, identical except for a constant shifting one to the right.  Under 
translation invariance the shifted risk should have a higher risk measure. 
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Figure 7. Translation Invariance Axiom Illustration 
 
 The second property is subadditivity, which means that the measure of any two 
risks together must be less than or equal to the sum of the measures of the two risks.  
This property ensures that a single large, unacceptable risk cannot be separated into 
two smaller, acceptable ones (Artzner et al., 1999:209).  The potential problem with 
this property is that it does not allow for the possibility that putting two acceptable 
risks together may create a situation with unacceptably large risk. 
 Figure 8 shows the probability density functions of two independent risks, X 
and Y, and a third, Z = X + Y, which is the sum of the first two.  Under subadditivity, 
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the risk measure of Z must be at least as large as the sum of the risk measures of X 
and Y. 
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Figure 8. Subadditivity Axiom Illustration 
 
 The third coherence property is positive homogeneity, which states that if a risk is 
multiplied by a positive constant, its risk measure must also be multiplied by the 
positive constant.  This property guarantees that the measure of risk increases 
proportionally to the risk. 
 Figure 9 shows the probability density functions of a single risk, X, and two 
other risks, Y = 2X, and Z = 3X.  Under positive homogeneity, the risk measure of the 
Y must be exactly twice the risk measure of X and the risk measure of Z must be 
exactly three times the risk measure X. 
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Figure 9.  Positive Homogeneity Axiom Illustration 
 
 The final coherence axiom is monotonicity, which states that larger severities 
should result in larger risk measures.  Under monotonicity, then, a larger risk 
measure implies a riskier situation (Artzner et al., 1999:210).  This axiom implies that 
if one risk stochastically dominates another risk, it will have a larger risk measure. 
2.3.4. Finance and Actuarial Science Approaches to Risk 
 A second broad area of risk modeling comes from financial management and 
actuarial science.  These fields have the advantage of dealing with dollars, so 
severities tend to be more easily quantifiable.  In finance, the general approach to risk-
modeling is risk-value theory.  Actuarial science uses two different models, the 
individual model which sums policy claims in a single time period and the collective 
model which traces claims over multiple time periods. 
2.3.4.1. Risk-Value Modeling 
 In every application of risk, risk modeling attempts to capture two characteris-
tics of the system in question.  First, there is an aspect of variation.  The less certainty 
in the outcome of a situation, the more risky it is considered.  Second, there is an 
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aspect of “badness” in which more severe outcomes are more risky than less severe 
ones (Sarin and Weber, 1993:139).  Trading off these two aspects against each other is 
the basic premise of risk-value modeling.   
 In risk-value modeling risks are considered gambles, with each risk a random 
variable that can have both positive and negative outcomes.  In a financial application 
where the risk is associated with the final wealth of some investment, the literature 
proposes variance as one possible measure of risk.  This measure explicitly ignores 
expectation, with risk measured purely on the spread of the outcomes.  The problem 
with variance as a sole measure of risk is that an investment with an increasing 
variance in the direction of increasing wealth will intuitively be less risky (Mitchell 
and Gelles, 2002:109). 
 The first significant work in risk-value was done by Markowitz in the 1950s.  
He proposed “semi-variance” as a measure of risk.  Semi-variance is the variance of 
the risk random variable in the downside or worst outcome tail (Markowitz, 1959:189).  
Generally the expected value is used to define the start of the tail, but any arbitrary 
point can be used (Estrada, 2003:10).  The semi-variance of a risk X (where larger 
values correspond with worse outcomes) with probability density function f(x) and 
expected value µ is calculated as 
 E[min(X-µ,0)2] = . ( ) ( )∫
∞
−
µ
µ dxxfx 2 (7)
“Downside standard deviation” can be calculated by taking the square root of 
Equation (7) (Estrada, 2003:10). 
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 Alternatively, variance can be combined with expected return in a linear 
combination (Sarin and Weber, 1993:137).  This allows for the intuitively pleasing 
property that “mean preserving spreads” or lower expected returns correspond to 
higher risk.  A mean preserving spread is a change in a random variable that has no 
effect on the expectation, but increases the variance (Mitchell and Gelles, 2002:110).  
The linear combination measure, as a tradeoff between the expectation and the 
variation, allows for the fact that an improvement in expected value may result in a 
willingness to accept more uncertainty. 
 Some authors propose going beyond expectation and variance to use higher 
order moments of the risk distribution in order to measure risk (Sarin and 
Weber, 1993:138).  While these measures, such as E[Xθ] where θ is a parameter to be 
varied by the decision maker, add complexity to the analysis, it is not clear what 
additional insight they provide into the riskiness of a situation. 
 Another risk measurement from finance is the risk premium, the difference 
between the expected payoff and the amount an individual is willing to accept with 
certainty.  Calculation of the risk premium requires knowledge of not only the 
distribution of the outcomes of the gamble, but also the utility associated with 
different outcomes (Sarin and Weber, 1993:139). 
 Recent work in risk-value theory goes beyond distribution moments to 
incorporate utility theory.  This allows risk judgment and preferences to be 
incorporated into the modeling of risk (Sarin and Weber, 1993:135).  Using utility in a 
risk-value model accounts for two different factors that may influence individual 
ordering of risks.  First, individual preferences may result in different individuals 
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ranking identical risks in different ways.  Second, the number of times that a risk will 
be experienced affects uncertainty.  In one formulation of risk-value using utility, the 
“standard risk”, X’, is the original risk random variable adjusted so that the expected 
value is 0, that is, X’=X-E[X].  The utility that the decision maker attaches to this new 
random variable is a measure of risk independent of expected return (Jia and 
Dyer, 1996:1692). 
2.3.4.2. Value at Risk 
 Similar in name but not otherwise related to risk-value modeling, value at risk 
is the most common shorthand description of risk in financial applications.  Value at 
risk focuses on risks over time and is an estimate of the maximum amount of loss 
possible for a given investment (Sarma et al., 2003:339).  Various forecasting 
techniques are used to calculate value at risk.  The “delta-gamma” model, for 
example, can be used when risks in an investment portfolio are quadratic and 
normally distributed (Castellacci and Siclari, 2003:530).  Another approach uses the 
“autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic” (ARCH) model (Cabelo Semper and 
Clemente, 2003:516).  Regardless of the particular forecasting method used, once an 
estimate of the value at risk has been calculated, a likelihood is attached to this figure 
(Cabelo Semper and Clemente, 2003:517). 
2.3.4.3. Individual Actuarial Model 
 The individual risk model considers each insurance policy as a unique random 
variable.  In a specified time period, some of the policies will have no claims and the 
others that do have claims will vary in size according to some probability distribution.  
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The total dollar amount of claims is a random variable C = X1 + X2 + X3 + … where Xi 
are independent random variables of the claim sizes of different insurance policies 
(including the possibility of no claim).  Time is not included in the model (Kaas et 
al., 2001:28). 
 The model requires two different inputs.  First, the probability that each policy 
will have a claim in the time period in question must be known.  Second, the 
distribution of the size of claims must be known.  With these two inputs, the 
distribution of C can be calculated using convolution or numerical approximation 
techniques (Kaas et al., 2001:20). 
 The individual actuarial model intuitively matches the real world, since the 
claim size of each policy is represented as its own random variable.  It has the 
disadvantage of only considering one time period.  The assumption of independence 
between the different policies can be inappropriate when, for example, a fire in an 
apartment building results in multiple claims from several different policies (Kaas 
et al., 2001:28). 
2.3.4.4. Collective Actuarial Model 
 An alternative actuarial approach is the collective risk model, in which an 
insurance portfolio is viewed as a stochastic process.  In this model claims occur at 
random time intervals and the size of each claim follows some probability 
distribution.  The total dollar amount of claims, C(t), is a function of the number of 
claims through time t, N(t), and the size of each claim. 
 C(t) = X1 + X2 + X3 + … + XN(t) (8)
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where the Xis are independent, identically distributed random variables of claim size 
over time.  The number of claims over a time interval is often modeled according to a 
Poisson or negative binomial distribution (Kaas et al., 2001:45). 
 Implementation of the collective model requires the frequency with which 
claims are filed and the distribution of claim sizes.  The model assumption of 
independence between the number of claims and the size of each claim may conflict 
with reality, where a single catastrophic event can result in a large number of claims 
of large size, but in practice the collective model seems to work well (Kaas 
et al., 2001:46). 
 The canonical risk model in actuarial science assumes that insurance claims 
arrive according to a Poisson process and that claim sizes are independent and 
identically distributed.  The resulting stochastic process is modeled as a surplus 
process, U(t), representing the wealth of the insurer at time t, given by 
 
( )
1
( )
N t
i
i
U t u pt Y
=
= + −∑ . (9)
The initial wealth of the insurer is represented by u.  Premium payments arrive at a 
constant rate, p, and the claims, Yi, follow some general distribution with mean size, 
β.  The number of claims in time t, N(t), is a Poisson random variable with rate λt.  
“Ruin” occurs when the total claims paid-to-date, C(t), is greater than the sum of 
initial wealth and premiums paid-to-date.  Figure 10 shows an example surplus 
process (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:71). 
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Figure 10. Surplus Process 
 
 “Ruin probability,” ψ, is the chance that ruin ever occurs.  Ruin probability is a 
measure of the credit risk of the firm or the riskiness of some portfolio of policies.  
The stability condition for the surplus process is p > λβ, which implies that, in the 
long run, premium payments exceed claims (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:71). 
 The probability of ruin in the canonical risk model is determined by four 
factors: the arrival rate of claims, the rate at which premiums are paid, the initial 
wealth of the firm, and the distribution of claim size.  Ruin probability increases with 
a higher claim rate, lower premium rate, lower initial wealth or larger claim sizes.  
Except in rare cases, ruin probability cannot be solved analytically and must be 
simulated.  When claim size is exponentially distributed, however, ruin probability 
can be calculated directly according to the following formula: 
 exp 1
u
c c
λβ λβψ
β
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (10)
For all distributions of claim size, an upper bound on the probability of ruin can be 
calculated if the moment generating function of the claim size distribution exists.  
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Lundberg’s upper bound of ruin probability, ψ < e-Ru, is a function of the initial wealth 
and the adjustment coefficient, R, which is the unique solution to the equation 
 λ + cR = λMY(R) (11)
where MY(·) is the moment generating function of the claim size distribution 
(Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:71). 
 When claim sizes do not follow an exponential distribution, ruin probability 
cannot be directly calculated.  Because ruin is a rare event in many cases, direct 
simulation can be highly inefficient.  The surplus process can be simulated over a 
long period of time without ruin ever occurring, even though the actual probability of 
ruin is greater than zero.  This means that there is no natural stopping condition for a 
simulation.  There are several techniques available to handle this problem and 
estimate the probability of ruin.  Importance sampling uses a change in probability to 
measure to make ruin certain.  The process can then be simulated until ruin occurs, 
and ruin probability calculated based on the simulated time (Vázquez-Abad and 
LeQuoc, 2001:72).  The storage process technique (also known as the buffer content) 
measures the amount of time the process spends above some level of wealth.  Finally, 
the convolution formula technique uses the sequence of losses in the process, where 
each loss is defined as a new low in the value of the process (Vázquez-Abad and 
LeQuoc, 2001:73). 
 Calculating ruin probability for the collective actuarial model might apply in a 
military context to risk in weapons inventory or troop levels.  Inventories slowly 
building over time and depleting quickly in wartime may possibly be modeled with a 
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surplus process.  The probability of ruin is the probability that the inventory stock 
empties completely or falls below some critical threshold level. 
2.4. Summary of Risk Literature 
 Because risk appears in many academic disciplines, the approaches vary 
significantly.  While much of the literature focuses on the specifics of gathering 
empirical data or taking actions to mitigate risk in a particular field, some techniques 
are general to many kinds of risk.  This chapter has summarized issues and 
techniques in the more mathematical approaches to risk. 
 Although a situation with a deterministic negative outcome can be considered a 
risk, in most cases risk implies uncertainty about future events.  This uncertainty can 
come from insufficient knowledge, natural variability or vagueness in model 
specification.  When uncertainty comes from an intelligent opponent, a game-
theoretic framework may be helpful in understanding the relevant factors.  When 
parameters are uncertain, interval or possibility distributions may be useful for 
modeling. 
 Risk in engineering applications, known as reliability analysis, focuses on 
breaking possible failures into their component parts.  After risk has been quantified, 
tools like the Farmer curve and precautionary principle can point decision makers to 
the mitigating actions necessary to reduce or eliminate risk. 
 Generic decision analysis techniques may be relevant to the study of risk as 
well.  Ranking tools like non-parametric decision rules and the ELECTRE and 
lexicographic methodologies allow the analyst to use limited information about risks 
to order or prioritize them. 
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 The most mathematically oriented risk approaches come from the financial 
management and actuarial science fields.  Risk-value models use moments of the 
probability distribution of risks to create single-number risk measures.  Actuarial 
science employs two models of risk, the individual and collective models, to combine 
multiple risks into a single portfolio. 
 Table 3 provides a summary of all of the approaches explained in this chapter. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Academic Approaches to Risk 
Approach Features Application Advantages/Disadvantages Reference 
Individual actuarial 
model 
total risk as sum of separate 
independent risks; ignores time
insurance simple concept; requires good 
estimate of CDF, especially tail; 
requires convolution or numerical 
methods 
Kaas et al. 
19 
Collective actuarial 
model 
total risk as a sum of claims 
over time; claims often Poisson
distributed 
insurance computationally efficient; requires 
distribution of number of claims and 
size of each claim 
Kaas et al. 
46 
Non-parametric 
decision tools 
select best possible outcome, 
least worst outcome or 
variation of these 
many 
applications 
does not require probability 
distributions; different rules can give 
different result; requires all 
alternatives to be identified 
Fleisher 292 
ELECTRE method sequential elimination; series 
of pairwise comparisons 
many 
applications 
requires certainty 
does not require completeness or 
that each pair of alternatives are 
comparable 
Chankong 
207 
Farmer curve plot of frequency versus 
severity with line indicating 
acceptability threshold 
nuclear 
radiation 
release levels 
simple in concept but difficult to 
determine where to draw curve 
Henley 13 
Reliability bottom-up approach breaks 
system into components or 
identifies all possible failure 
causes (FMEA, criticality 
analysis, fault tree analysis) 
engineering 
systems 
generally easier to estimate 
probabilities at component level; 
analysis quickly becomes very large 
Henley 40 
partitioned multi-
objective risk method 
breaks severity axis into pieces
and calculates conditional 
expected values 
flooding complex  Haimes 
Hierarchical 
holographic modeling 
layered multiple models 
examining system from 
different perspectives 
water supply draws from expertise in 
management, technology, law, etc.; 
more useful for identifying than 
quantifying risks 
Haimes 
working 
paper 15 
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Approach Features Application Advantages/Disadvantages Reference 
Impact intensity measures component level 
(cost, schedule, technical, etc) 
potential negative impact and 
then system impact using 
additive or multiplicative 
function 
engineering 
acquisition 
flags a risk when only one aspect of 
many is a problem; relies on 
subjective probability estimates 
Cho et al. 25,
Ayyub 61 
Risk-value theory measures of risk based on 
expected value and variance 
finance measure of risk (number) easier to 
understand and rank than a 
distribution; hard to determine the 
best measure for a particular 
application 
Sarin and 
Weber 137 
MCDA linear 
programming 
takes ranking or other 
conditions specifying weighting 
and value scoring and converts
to linear program to identify 
dominated or potentially 
optimal alternatives 
general allows for uncertainty in both value 
scoring and weighting; number of 
required LP problems can grow 
quickly 
Eum et al. 
397 
Lexicographic method sequential elimination; ranks 
alternatives one criterion at a 
time, starting with most 
important 
general simple implementation, requires only 
ordinal scoring 
Chankong 
200 
Precautionary 
principle 
assume worst case scenario environmental 
protection 
no probability estimates necessary; 
requires identification of worst 
possible outcome 
Klinke and 
Renn 1071 
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1. Methodology Overview 
 There are two key steps in the prioritization of risks.  First, the proposed 
methodology models each risk as a random variable with an associated probability 
distribution.  For risks associated with shortfalls in Air Force capabilities, each of 
these risks can be conditioned on existing capability, with adjustments based on the 
prevention and mitigation effect of any capability change.  The second step in risk 
prioritization is the development of an appropriate risk measure that translates each 
distribution into a single quantity. 
3.2. Modeling Risk 
 This thesis borrows from the actuarial science definition of risk as a non-
negative random variable of severity (Kaas et al., 2001:223).  This differs from the 
CRRA definition by its inclusion of likelihood.  Each shortfall in capability has an 
associated risk, a chance that undesirable consequences will occur.  This methodology 
expands the actuarial definition by making a subtle distinction between severity and 
risk.  Conceptually, severity refers to any possible undesirable outcome.  A 
distribution of severity describes the likelihood of occurrence of any of these 
outcomes.  Risk includes the distribution of severity, but also includes the possibility 
that no severity will occur.  When the occurrence of an adverse event is certain, then, 
risk and severity are equivalent concepts.  When some probability exists, however, 
that an adverse event will not occur, the distribution of risk and distribution of 
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severity are different.  The following sections describe a method for mathematically 
constructing these severity and risk distributions. 
3.2.1. Visualizing Risks 
 Graphically, severity can be shown with a probability density function (for 
continuous risks) or probability mass function (for discrete risks).  A density function 
shows the likelihood of taking on any severity level.  Figure 11 shows three example 
severity density functions.  A probability density function for a risk could have a 
point mass at zero to account for the probability of no adverse event occurrence. 
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Figure 11.  Example Probability Densities of Severity 
 
 Alternatively, severity and risk may be visualized by a distribution function. 
This function, describing the probability that severity will be greater than some value, 
is known as the complementary cumulative distribution function, the decumulative 
distribution function or the survival function.  This thesis will use the term severity 
distribution function and the notation S(x), or the term risk distribution function and 
the notation R(x) for these functions describing the probability that severity exceeds 
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the value x.  Figure 12 shows example severity distribution functions.  Note that for 
any severity distribution function, the probability that severity is greater than zero is 
unity.  This does not have to be true for a risk distribution function. 
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Figure 12.  Example Severity Distributions 
 
3.2.2. Modeling Severity 
 The CRRA team has specified severity using eight risk factors, reflecting the 
fact that negative consequences in a military context come in several forms.  The 
eight risk factors are achievement of objectives, friendly casualties, friendly capability, 
friendly infrastructure, collateral damage, enemy escalation/weapons of mass destruction, 
U.S. national integrity, and U.S. government function.  Each of these risk factors has 
verbal descriptions identifying the level of risk with one of six severity categories.  
Severity categories range from minor to catastrophic (AFSAA, 2003:19-20).  Table 4 
shows the severity descriptions for the friendly casualties factor.  The descriptions and 
severity categories of all eight factors are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 4.  Severity Categories and Descriptions for Friendly Casualties 
Minor Modest Substantial Major Extensive Catastrophic 
Few citizens/troops 
killed/ injured.  Citizens 
overseas threatened. 
Tens of citizens/troops 
killed/ injured.  Citizens 
overseas attacked/ 
injured. 
Hundreds of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Citizens 
overseas attacked/ 
taken hostage. 
Hundreds to thousands
of citizens/troops killed/
injured.  Citizens 
overseas killed/ taken 
hostage. 
Thousands to tens of 
thousands of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Citizens 
overseas killed/ taken 
hostage. 
Hundreds of thousands 
of citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Many citizens 
overseas killed/ taken 
hostage. 
 
 In order to mathematically model risk, these qualitative categories of severity 
must be translated into numerical values.  An index linking each category to a 
number explicitly states not just that some outcomes are worse than others, but by 
how much they are worse.  This changes the existing ordinal ranking into a ratio scale, 
with zero equivalent to no severity. 
 Under the existing quantification system of the categories, all categorical step 
increases in severity are equal, with minor indexed to one, modest to two, up to 
catastrophic indexed to six (AFSAA, 2003:37).  With this index, a shift from minor 
severity to modest severity is equivalent in magnitude of change to an increase from 
major severity to extensive severity.  Multiplying each of the values by 100 and 
dividing by 6 results in the normalized index (rounded to the nearest tenth) in Table 
5, with zero equivalent to no adverse event and one hundred equivalent to catastrophe.  
This index implies that, for example, seven minor events are worse than a single 
catastrophic event because 7 times 16.5 is greater than 100. 
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Table 5.  Linear and Discrete Severity Index 
Category Severity Index 
minor 16.7 
modest 33.3 
substantial 50.0 
major 66.7 
extensive 83.3 
catastrophic 100.0 
 
 This discrete index leaves unclear, for example, whether severity 40 would be 
classified as modest or substantial.  To avoid these gaps in the index, we can employ 
intervals as shown in Table 6 (Choobineh and Behrens, 1992:909).  Unlike the discrete 
index, the range zero to one hundred is divided into five equal intervals.  This index 
does not restrict catastrophic severity, which can grow infinitely large as any value 
greater than one hundred.  The interval severity index allows translations from 
category to number or from number to category.  The linear trend still holds, since, 
for example, a step from the worst minor severity to the worst modest severity is the 
same as a step from the “best” substantial severity to the “best” major severity. 
 
Table 6.   Linear Interval Severity Index 
Category Severity Index 
minor 0 < x ≤ 20 
modest 20 < x ≤ 40 
substantial 40 < x ≤ 60 
major 60 < x ≤ 80 
extensive 80 < x ≤ 100 
catastrophic x > 100 
 
 Categorical step increases in severity do not have to be equal.  If a step in 
categorical severity grows multiplicatively, for example, a multiplicative index must 
be used.  Table 7 shows indices where an increase of one category implies a doubling, 
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tripling or ten times the severity.  To calculate these indices start with the top 
value, 100, and divide by the appropriate multiplicative factor.  Continue dividing 
until all five sub-catastrophic categories are specified. 
 
Table 7.  Logarithmic Interval Severity Indices 
Category Log2 Severity 
Index 
Log3 Severity 
Index 
Log10 Severity 
Index 
minor 0 < x ≤ 6.3 0 < x ≤ 1.2 0 < x ≤ .01 
modest 6.3 < x ≤ 13 1.2 < x ≤ 3.7 .01 < x ≤ .10 
substantial 13 < x ≤ 25 3.7 < x ≤ 11 .10 < x ≤ 1.0 
major 25 < x ≤ 50 11 < x ≤ 33 1.0 < x ≤ 10 
extensive 50 < x ≤ 100 33 < x ≤ 100 10 < x ≤ 100 
catastrophic x > 100 x > 100 x > 100 
 
 Regardless of the precise index used to convert categorical severity ratings to 
numerical scores, care must be taken to correctly express the true relationships.  It is 
possible to mix indices with some steps increasing by half, others doubling or tripling.  
However, if a major severity event is considered equivalent to five modest events, for 
example, the lower limit of the major score must be five times the lower limit of the 
modest score and the upper limit of the major score must be five times the upper limit 
of the modest score. 
3.2.3. Eliciting Probabilities 
 After severity has been appropriately quantified, a probability distribution of 
severity can be estimated by eliciting probabilities from subject matter experts.  A 
number of existing parametric probability distributions may be appropriate.  
Actuarial science most often uses the exponential, Weibull and Pareto distributions to 
model the size of insurance claims (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:78).  Each of 
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these three distributions generally follows a form in which less severe outcomes are 
more likely than more severe ones, which may make these distributions appropriate 
for modeling severity outcomes in a military context. 
 The great advantage of the exponential distribution is its simplicity.  If severity 
is exponentially distributed, only one number must be elicited from the decision 
maker (or other subject matter experts) in order to determine the value of the single 
parameter, λ.  There are two possible approaches.  First, the decision maker may 
provide the average or mean severity, in which case λ = 1 / (mean severity) 
(Wackerly et al., 2002:178).  Alternatively, the decision maker may provide the 
probability that severity exceeds some value, x.  The λ parameter follows directly as 
 λ = – ln(P{Severity>x}) / x (12)
where 
 S(x) ≡ P{Severity>x} = e-λx. (13)
 If severity cannot be assumed to be exponentially distributed, other parameters 
must be elicited.  One alternative is to specify a discrete distribution for the first five 
severity levels and use an exponential distribution for the catastrophic severity tail 
(Bratley et al., 1987:125).  An example of such a distribution is shown in Figure 13.  
This distribution specifies a probability of minor severity, a probability of modest 
severity, and so forth.  The sum of the probabilities of severities less than catastrophic 
is subtracted from one, and this result is used in Equation (12) to determine the 
exponential tail of catastrophic outcomes. 
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Figure 13.  Probability Mass Function with Continuous Tail 
 
 Alternatively, the decision maker may provide the probability that severity is 
greater than some (or all) of the severity categories and a continuous probability 
distribution may be fitted to the data as shown in Figure 14.  (See Section 4.4 for an 
example of how to fit a Weibull distribution given three exceedance probabilities.) 
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Figure 14.  Fitted Continuous Distribution 
 
To move from a distribution of severity to a distribution of risk, subject matter 
experts must provide one additional input, the probability that an adverse event 
occurs, that is, the probability that severity is greater than zero.  The risk distribution 
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function, R(x), then, is the severity distribution function, S(x), multiplied by this 
probability of occurrence, (1-p). 
3.2.4. Conditioning on Capability 
 Severity and risk distributions may not be fixed over time.  As Air Force 
capabilities change, the probability of adverse event occurrence may increase or 
decrease, or the shape of the severity distribution may change in some way.  In 
general, a change in capability can have two effects.  First, it can prevent, reducing the 
probability that any adverse event will occur.  This is an effect on the risk distribution 
and not on the severity distribution.  Second, it can mitigate, reducing the severity of 
the effects of an adverse event.  This is an effect on the severity distribution.  The 
academic literature does not always distinguish between these two effects, preferring 
the term “mitigation” to refer to both a reduction in probability of occurrence and 
resulting severity (Ayyub, 2003:107).  These two effects make distinctly different 
changes in a distribution, however, and the next sections describe the ways in which 
these two effects of capability act on the distribution of risk. 
3.2.4.1. Prevention 
 Prevention is a reduction in the chance that any severity will occur.  Under 
complete prevention, there is no chance of any severity occurring, a riskless situation.  
A preventive action could make it physically impossible for an adverse event to occur 
or merely discourage or deter an enemy from creating that adverse event.  In either 
case, the risk is reduced by a decrease in the probability of any negative outcome. 
 Prevention may be a monotonically increasing function of capability, defined 
between zero and one, as shown in Figure 15.  That is, any increase in capability 
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decreases the likelihood of an adverse event.  In some cases, however, increasing 
capability could encourage preemptive action from an enemy; in such a case an 
increase in capability would increase the likelihood of an adverse event.  This would 
result in prevention as a decreasing function of capability.  While this latter function is 
possible, this research assumes increasing capability increases prevention over the 
analysis time horizon. 
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Figure 15.  Examples of Prevention Functions 
 
 The prevention function focuses particularly on the capability being considered, 
but potentially also includes any number of other capabilities with interactive effects.  
A simple model assumes that the other capabilities provide negligible preventive 
effect. 
 Minimum prevention occurs when capability is zero and the prevention from 
other capabilities is negligible.  This case does not imply that an adverse event is 
guaranteed to occur, because the initial risk distribution could have a nonzero 
probability that the adverse event will not occur even without any capability. 
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 Under prevention, the distribution function of the risk, rather than starting at 
zero, starts at the prevention level (Kaas et al., 2001:27).  Figure 16 shows three risks 
with different levels of prevention.  With low (0.1) prevention, the probability of at 
least some severe outcome is high.  As prevention increases, the probability of (at 
least some) severity decreases, so risk decreases.  Only the “starting value” of the 
distribution changes as prevention shifts; the shape of the distribution is unaffected. 
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Figure 16.  Effect of Prevention on Distribution of Risk 
 
3.2.4.2. Mixed Discrete and Continuous Probability Distributions 
 This section describes the mathematics that allow prevention, where the risk 
distribution “starts” at some value less than one.  In actuarial science, a claim 
distribution can be a mixture of a discrete and continuous random variable when 
there is some nonzero probability that the claim value is zero (Kaas et al., 2001:22).  Let 
X be a discrete random variable on the occurrence of an adverse event such that 
⎩
⎨
⎧
−
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 Let Y|X be a continuous, exponentially distributed random variable of the 
severity of the adverse event, conditional on whether that event occurs.  That is, Y 
assumes the value 0 if X = 0 and Y ~ exponential(λ) if X = 1.  Then Y is the 
unconditional random variable on severity, combining X and Y|X. 
 P{Y > y} = P{Y > y | X = 0}P{X = 0} + P{Y > y | X = 1}P{X = 1}, (14)
 P{Y > y} = 0 p + e-λy (1 – p), (15)
 P{Y > y} = e-λy (1 – p). (16)
 In the more general case, when Y|X follows some general distribution, S(y), the 
risk distribution function of Y is the severity distribution function of Y|X multiplied 
by one minus the prevention value. 
 P{Y > y} = P{Y > y | X = 0}P{X = 0} + P{Y > y | X = 1}P{X = 1}, (17)
 P{Y > y} = P{Y > y}(1 – p), (18)
 P{Y > y} = S(y) (1 – p). (19)
 
3.2.4.3. Mitigation 
 Separate from prevention, a second possible effect of a change in capability is 
mitigation, a reduction in severity if, despite one’s best efforts, an adverse event does 
occur.  While prevention affects the risk distribution, it has no effect on the severity 
distribution.  Mitigation changes the distribution of severity. 
 Like prevention, mitigation may be a monotonically increasing function of 
capability.  That is, an increase in capability always reduces the severity of the 
outcome.  A case could exist, however, where increasing capability increases severity.  
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For example, if improved mobility allows friendly forces to respond more rapidly to a 
crisis, they may be more vulnerable to attack. 
 The effect of mitigation on the severity distribution function is not as clear as 
the effect of prevention on the risk distribution function.  An unmitigated severity 
distribution stochastically dominates the mitigated severity distribution, but it is not 
obvious how the distribution might change shape.  (See Section 3.3.1 for explanation 
of stochastic dominance.) 
 If mitigation equally affects all levels of severity, it makes the most sense for 
mitigation to change a scale parameter of the distribution.  The scale parameter 
defines the measurement of the range of values.  Changing the scale parameter 
spreads or tightens the distribution, while keeping the same essential shape (Law and 
Kelton, 2000:198). 
 If mitigation primarily affects just part of the distribution, however, a change in 
the shape parameter will be necessary.  This would occur if an increase in capability 
only mitigated the most catastrophic severities, for example. 
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Figure 17.  Effect of Mitigation on the Distribution of Severity 
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3.2.4.4. Overall Model 
 When both prevention and mitigation are included, the overall distribution of 
risk is 
 P{Severity > x} = (1 – p) P{Severitymitigated ≤ y} (20)
 Increasing prevention reduces the probability that any adverse event occurs, 
while mitigation changes the shape or scale of the distribution of random variable of 
severity.  It will be necessary to model each mitigation effect on a case by case basis. 
3.3. Measuring Risk 
 After a risk has been fully modeled, including a mapping from ordinal severity 
categories to a continuous quantitative index and conditioning on capability, risks can 
be measured.  A risk measure is a number derived from a risk distribution that 
summarizes the distribution in a single value.  The remainder of this chapter explains 
four basic tools for the measurement of risk: expectation, conditional expectation, 
risk-value measurement and distortion functions. 
 There are two features of risk a good risk measure will capture.  First, it should 
include some aspect of the variation in the outcome.  For two risks with the same 
expected value, the one with the greater range or variability is generally considered 
more risky.  Second, a risk measure should capture something of the undesirable 
consequences of outcomes.  For two risks with the same shape of distribution, the one 
with the higher expected severity is generally considered more risky (Sarin and 
Weber, 1993:139). 
 If the analytic goal is to rank risks, risk measurement is only necessary when it 
is unclear from the distributions which risk is less desirable than another.  When the 
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distributions can be ranked without using measurement, risks are stochastically 
ordered.  To understand stochastic orders, it is necessary to explain the concept of 
stochastic dominance. 
3.3.1. Stochastic Dominance 
 The cleanest ranking of risks occurs when one risk stochastically dominates 
another.  When one risk is stochastically dominant, it has a greater probability of 
excessive severity at all points and the distribution functions never cross (Kaas 
et al., 2001:226).  Two such risks are shown in Figure 18, with the solid line risk 
stochastically dominantly over the dotted line risk.  Mathematically, consider two 
risks with respective risk functions R1(x) and R2(x).  The first risk is stochastically 
greater than the second if R1(x) ≥ R2(x) for all x (Kulkarni, 1995:586). 
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Figure 18. Stochastically Dominant Risk 
 
 When stochastic dominance does not exist, or a decision maker requires a 
quantification of the differences between risks, one of four risk measurement tools is 
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appropriate.  Under dominance, the greater risk will always have a higher risk 
measure.  This fulfills the coherent risk measure axiom of monotonicity (Artzner 
et al., 1999:210).  The next four sections explain each of these measures, along with 
their advantages and disadvantages. 
3.3.2. Mathematical Expectation Measure 
 The simplest measure of risk is the mean or expected severity.  The 
mathematical expectation of a risk can be calculated using the probability density 
function, f(x), or the risk distribution function, R(x), by integrating over the entire 
range of severities (Kulkarni, 1995:562) as shown in Equation (21). 
 Risk Measureexpectation = E[X] =  = . ( )∫
∞
0
dxxxf ( )∫
∞
0
dxxR (21)
 The advantage of expectation as a risk measure is its common use and 
familiarity to decision makers.  The major disadvantage is that the expectation is 
largely unaffected by changes in the tail of the distribution, leading decision makers 
to ignore the highly unlikely but catastrophic outcomes.  The risk assessment and 
management process is generally most concerned with those catastrophic outcomes 
(Haimes, 1998:17).  The three remaining risk measures seek to overcome this 
shortcoming of expectation by giving extra consideration to the extreme outcomes. 
3.3.3. Risk-Value Measure 
 Risk-value begins to deal with the major problem of expectation by including 
the second moment of the distribution, the variance.  In a risk-value measure the 
decision maker commits to some tradeoff between (expected) value and the 
uncertainty associated with an outcome (Sarin and Weber, 1993:136). 
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 The simplest risk-value measure is a linear combination of expectation and 
variance, or expectation and standard deviation (Sarin and Weber, 1993:137). 
 Risk measurerisk value = a E[X] – (1-a) σX  (22)
where σX is the standard deviation of X and a is a value between 0 and 1. 
 The variance of the risk distribution can be calculated similarly to the 
expectation, with the probability density function or the risk distribution function.  
Equation (23) shows the common form of variance calculation, and Equations (24) 
and (25) follow as forms specific to risk distributions with distribution function R(x). 
 Var[X] =  ( ) [ ]( )2
0
2 XEdxxfx −∫
∞
(23)
 
= ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
00
22 100 ⎟
⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛−−+= ∫∫
∞∞
dxxRdxxR
dx
dxXp  (24)
 
= . ( )( ) ( )
2
00
2 1 ⎟
⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛−− ∫∫
∞∞
dxxRxRdx (25)
The standard deviation follows as the square root of the variance. 
 For an exponentially distributed risk, with probability (1-p) of occurrence of an 
adverse event and parameter λ, the expectation and variance can be calculated as 
 E[X] =  ( )∫
∞
0
dxxR (26)
 = ( )
0
1 xp e dxλ
∞ −− ∫  (27)
 = (1-p) / λ. (28)
 
 Var[X] =  ( ) [ ]( )2
0
2 XEdxxfx −∫
∞
(29)
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⎝ ⎠∫  
(30)
 
= 
2
2
1 p
λ
− . (31)
 One advantage of the risk-value measure is that it does not require that the 
entire distribution be specified.  If the analyst can determine just the first two 
moments of the distribution, a risk-value measure can be calculated.  A second 
advantage is that the measure can be plotted against the tradeoff parameter, a, so the 
decision maker can visualize the tradeoff between expectation and variance. 
 Consider two risks shown in Figure 19.  The solid line risk, which has a greater 
probability of an adverse event occurring, has the larger expected severity.  The 
dotted line risk, which has a lower probability of an adverse event occurring but a 
heavier distribution tail, has a larger variance. 
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
severity
P
ro
b(
S
ev
er
ity
>x
)
 
Figure 19.  Undominated Risks 
 
 Figure 20 shows the tradeoff in the risk-value measure as priority is moved from 
expectation to standard deviation.  When standard deviation is the most highly 
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weighted component, the heavier-tailed dotted line risk has the greater risk measure.  
When expectation is weighted higher than 0.6, the solid line risk has the greater risk 
measure.  When uncertainty in outcome, measured by the standard deviation, is a 
significant consideration, the dotted-line risk should be considered more risky.  If the 
uncertainty of outcome is relatively unimportant, and the focus is almost exclusively 
on expected severity, the solid-line risk is the most significant. 
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Figure 20. Risk-Value Measure of Risk 
 
 A disadvantage of the risk-value measure is the uncertainty of the appropriate 
tradeoff value.  Increasing the weight on standard deviation does not necessarily 
increase the focus on catastrophic events.  In addition, breakpoints where one risk 
measure crosses another do not have a clear interpretative value. 
3.3.4. Conditional Expectation Measure 
 Conditional expectation is a third possible measure of risk.  This measure 
completely ignores the low severity portions of the risk distribution, focusing on the 
distribution tail and the worst possible outcomes as shown in Figure 21.  The risk 
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measure is the expected severity, given that severity is greater (worse) than some 
target or accepted value.  That value can either be a severity threshold, or a quantile of 
the distribution (Benati, 2003:574). 
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Figure 21. Conditional Severity 
 
 The calculation of the conditional expectation risk measure comes from the 
calculation of residual system life in reliability.  Residual life is the expected 
remaining working time of a system, given that the system has already been in 
operation for a specified period of time (Ebeling, 1997:34).  For this study, the 
conditional expectation risk measure, instead of conditioning on time, conditions on 
some severity threshold, t. 
 Risk Measureconditional expectation = E[Severity | Severity > t] (32)
 
= t + ( ) ∫
∞
t
dxxR
tR
)(1  (33)
 The conditional threshold can be determined in two different ways.  First, the 
threshold can be specified directly as a severity value.  For example, the risk measure 
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could be expected severity, given that severity is greater than minor.  Alternatively, 
the threshold can be calculated from a specified quantile of the distribution.  For 
example, the risk measure could be the expected severity, given that severity is in the 
80th percentile of the distribution. 
 To calculate the threshold based on a specified quantile requires the inverse of 
the risk distribution function.  For the exponential distribution 
 R(threshold) = α = (1-p) e-λ threshold (34)
 threshold = – ln (α/(1-p)) / λ (35)
 With a specified severity threshold or distribution quantile, conditional 
expectation provides a single risk measure.  The measure can be plotted as a function 
of the chosen severity threshold to show the analyst or decision maker how the risk 
ranking might vary.  Figure 22 shows the risk measure of the risks in Figure 21 as a 
function of specified severity threshold.  When the threshold is low, and most of the 
distribution is considered in the calculation, the solid line risk has the higher measure 
and is considered more risky.  As the severity threshold increases, the dotted line risk, 
with a thicker distribution tail, becomes the risk with the higher measure. 
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Figure 22. Conditional Expectation as a Function of Severity Threshold 
 
 Figure 23 shows the alternative formulation of the conditional expectation risk 
measure.  The measure is plotted as a function of the proportion of the distribution, α, 
included in the expectation calculation.  As α decreases, less of the distribution is 
included in the calculation, and the risk measure increases for both risks.  Similar to 
the results from the specified threshold approach, when the risk measure is calculated 
in the distribution tail only, the heavier-tailed solid risk has the higher measure.  As a 
larger fraction of the distributions are included, the dotted line risk has the higher risk 
measure. 
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Figure 23. Conditional Expectation as a Function of Quantile 
 
 The primary advantage of the conditional expectation risk measure is its focus 
on the most severe possible outcomes.  If the tail of the risk distribution is properly 
specified, the portion of the distribution in the low severity outcomes does not have to 
be correct.  In addition, the prevention variable is not required at all, since the risk 
measure is calculated assuming an adverse event does occur.  In effect, this risk 
measure does not distinguish between the risk and severity distributions, and either 
can be used in calculations.  Finally, the measure is relatively easy to explain to a 
decision maker, and allows the analyst to vary the amount of the distribution used in 
the calculation to perform a sensitivity analysis. 
 The biggest disadvantage of the conditional expectation risk measure is that it 
ignores a large portion of the distribution.  Two risks with similar tails but different 
prevention parameters will have similar risk measures under this approach.  Decision 
makers concerned about the probability of occurrence will not be able to properly 
indicate their preferences with this risk measure.  Thus the conditional expectation 
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risk measure is only appropriate when the entire focus of the decision maker is on the 
worst possible outcomes. 
3.3.5. Distorted Expectation Measure 
 The final proposed measure of risk is the distorted expectation risk measure.  
This measure “distorts” the risk distribution function and then calculates the 
expectation of the distorted function.  Several distortion functions are available.  All 
of them, however, re-weight the densities, emphasizing more catastrophic severities 
and deemphasizing—but still including—less catastrophic ones.  This avoids the 
problem of conditional expectation’s ignoring a portion of the distribution (Wirch 
and Hardy, 1999:337). 
 Figure 24 shows a density function and its distortion.  The distortion “pushes” 
density into worse severities. 
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Figure 24. Actual and Distorted Severity Density Functions 
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 Figure 25 shows a risk distribution and its distortion.  The distorted distribution 
dominates the actual distribution at all levels of severity, reflecting the fact that the 
probabilities have been rescaled toward the worse severities.  This places a greater 
emphasis on higher severities, which may be so unlikely as to have little effect on the 
undistorted expectation.  Under the emphasis caused by distortion, these high 
severities are effectively given a higher priority.  If the decision maker has no desire 
to emphasize the higher severities, undistorted expectation is an appropriate measure 
of risk. 
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Figure 25. Actual and Distorted Risk Distribution Functions 
 
 The actuarial science literature identifies six different distortion functions, 
though some are special cases of others (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:141).  All distortion 
functions operate on the risk distribution.  The distribution can be distorted by 
applying the chosen distortion function, g(u), to the risk distribution function as 
follows:   
 Rdistorted(severity) = g(R(severity)) (36)
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 Regardless of the distortion function used, the risk measure is the expected 
value of the distorted distribution (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:137), calculated as the 
integral of the distorted distribution over the entire range of severity.  Increasing the 
distortion, which increases the relative weight on the more extreme outcomes, will 
increase the value of the risk measure. 
 Risk measuredistorted expectation =  ( )( )∫
∞
0
dxxRg (37)
 The gamma-beta distortion requires three parameters, a, b and c such that 0<a≤1, 
b≥1, c≥0, and is the most general and flexible distortion (McLeish and 
Reesor, 2003:141).  If the parameters a and b have values of one and the c parameter 
approaches infinity, there is no distortion.  Decreasing a or c, or increasing b increases 
the amount of distortion, shifting the distribution into the tail. 
 
gγβ(u) = 
( )
( ) dtett
dtett
c
tba
u
c
tba
∫
∫
−−−
−−−
−
−
1
0
11
0
11
1
1
 (38)
 The beta distortion allows the c parameter in the gamma-beta distortion to 
approach infinity, leaving a distortion function with two parameters (McLeish and 
Reesor, 2003:141).  As with the gamma-beta distortion, if the a and b parameters equal 1 
there is no distortion.  Decreasing the former or increasing the latter increases 
distortion. 
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 The proportional hazards distortion is the beta distortion with the b parameter held 
at one, leaving a single parameter with a simple distortion function (McLeish and 
Reesor, 2003:141).  This parameter is a measure of risk acceptance.  When a is one, 
there is no distortion, representing a risk neutral position.  Decreasing the a 
parameter because of increasing risk aversion increases the distortion. 
 gph(u) = ua (40)
 
 The dual-power transform is the beta distortion with the a parameter held at 1, 
leaving a single parameter, κ, which is equivalent to the b parameter (McLeish and 
Reesor, 2003:142).  When κ=1 there is no distortion; increasing κ, corresponding with 
increasing risk aversion, increases distortion so that 
 gdp(u) = 1 – (1 – u)b. (41)
 
 Another special case of the gamma-beta distortion is the gamma distortion, 
which holds the b parameter constant at one (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:142).  The a 
and c parameters are free to vary, and decreasing either of them increases the amount 
of distortion. 
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 The final special case of the gamma-beta distortion is the exponential distortion, 
which holds a and b at one, with the c parameter free to vary (McLeish and 
Reesor, 2003:142).  Decreasing the single parameter increases the distortion. 
 gexp(u) = (1 – e-u/c) / (1 – e-1/c) (43)
 
 In addition to the gamma-beta distortion and its special cases, the normal 
distortion can be used.  This distortion, with one parameter, c, uses a standard normal 
and inverse standard normal distribution (McLeish and Reesor, 2003:142). 
 g(u) = Φ[Φ-1(u) – c] (44)
 
 The literature does not provide specific guidance on when one distortion is 
preferred to another (Reesor, 2003).  However, the dual-power transform has two 
particular advantages.  First, it requires only a single parameter, while many of the 
other distortions require two or three.  Second, that parameter (κ) has a meaningful 
interpretation.  When κ is an integer, the resulting risk measure can be considered as 
the expectation of the worst result in κ sample observations of the risk (Wirch and 
Hardy, 1999:340).  Using the single-parameter dual-power distortion, risks can be 
compared graphically by plotting them versus the value of the distortion parameter, κ. 
 Distorted expectation requires the entire risk distribution to be known, and 
calculates a measure using the entire distribution, an advantage over the conditional 
expectation risk measure.  Some distorted measures are complicated, requiring 
multiple parameters, but the dual-power distortion requires a single parameter that 
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serves as a measure of risk aversion.  Using the dual-power distortion the analyst can 
rank risks at several levels of risk aversion, including the undistorted expectation, a 
risk-neutral measure. 
 The primary disadvantage of distorted expectation is its computational 
complexity.  As distortion increases the calculation becomes more and more complex, 
and depending on the distribution function may not be analytically tractable.  In 
addition, unlike a risk-value measure, distorted expectation requires the entire risk 
distribution to be known and specified.  While the fact that the distorted expectation 
risk measure uses the entire distribution is an advantage, the requirement that the 
entire distribution be specified places a higher demand on subject matter experts. 
3.4. Methodology Conclusions 
 In summary, risk can be mathematically modeled by treating it as a random 
variable with an associated probability distribution, including both the probability of 
occurrence of an adverse event and a distribution of the possible severities if an event 
occurs.  An exponential random variable has the advantage of simplicity, and may be 
useful for modeling military risk when little is known about the distribution of 
possible outcomes.  Risk distributions can be summarized using a risk measure. 
 The simplest risk measure, unconditional and undistorted expectation, serves as 
a baseline for the other three measures.  The risk-value measure is equal to the 
expectation when all the weight is on expectation and becomes less like expectation as 
more weight is placed on the standard deviation.  The conditional expectation 
measure is equal to the expectation measure when conditioning on the entire 
distribution, and becomes less like expectation as the severity threshold moves farther 
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into the distribution tail.  Finally, the distorted expectation measure is equal to 
expectation when there is no distortion, and moves away as distortion increases.  
Each of the alternatives to expectation, then, is a way to increase focus on the more 
severe outcomes that are highly unlikely, but potentially so catastrophic that they 
require the decision maker’s primary attention. 
 A risk-value measure requires only the first and second moments of a risk 
distribution, but does not necessarily offer a way to increase focus on the worst 
outcomes.  A conditional expectation risk measure focuses exclusively on the 
distribution tail, ignoring low severity regions of the distribution.  When a risk 
distribution can be completely specified, a distorted expectation measure, using the 
dual-power distortion function on the risk distribution offers a flexible tool for 
decision makers to summarize risk in a single number. 
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IV. Numerical Illustration and Results 
 
4.1. Implementation Overview 
 This chapter provides an illustration of the use of risk modeling and risk 
measurement techniques presented in Chapter III.  The nine top-level capabilities 
from the CRRA master capabilities library are reviewed.  Using four future global 
scenarios, each capability is given a notional, associated risk distribution.  These risk 
distributions are measured using the dual-power distorted expectation.  Finally, each 
risk measure is used to re-weight objective function coefficients in a linear program to 
suggest acquisition priorities. 
4.2. Optimization of Risk and Capability Alternatives 
 The goal of the CRRA is to integrate assessments of current capability and risk 
of capability shortfalls, suggest appropriate courses of action and ultimately provide 
guidance to the acquisition process (Jumper, 2002).  Future systems purchased by the 
Air Force purchases should reduce the shortfalls identified by the CRRA process.  
Risk measures provide a way not only to prioritize capability shortfalls but also to 
adjust the relative value of potential systems under consideration. 
 If the Air Force has a set of possible future systems, each providing some 
additional capability, and a budget constraint limiting the number of systems that can 
actually be acquired, the problem can be formulated as a mathematical program.  The 
objective is to maximize total value, while staying within the budget.  Risk measures 
can be used to adjust the values of each system, based on the relative importance of 
the capability shortfall that system starts to close. 
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 Under this construction, risk becomes a weighting of the importance of each 
capability shortfall.  Shortfalls identified as “more risky” will have higher measures 
of risk, effectively increasing the value of closing the capability gap, while shortfalls 
identified as “less risky” will have smaller measures of risk, and the value of any 
additional capability will be reduced. 
 For example, consider risks associated with each of the nine top-level 
capabilities identified by the Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment process.  The 
full Master Capabilities Library is included in Appendix B.  The nine broad 
capabilities are as follows: 
• Surveillance & reconnaissance involves conducting missions to satisfy the 
intelligence requirements of commanders. 
• Intelligence is developing “knowledge resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning 
foreign countries or areas.” 
• Command & control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces.” 
• Communications is the representation, transfer, interpretation and processing of 
data between people and machines. 
• Force application means engaging “a variety of targets throughout the battlespace.” 
• Force projection is the means to “extend national power around the globe in a timely 
manner.” 
• Protection involves “offensive and defensive actions required to respond to a full 
spectrum of threats and protect forces.” 
• Preparation & sustainment are the “activities required to establish operating locations, 
generate the mission … and create forces.” 
• Force creation is the organizing, equipping, and training of combat and support 
personnel. 
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 A shortfall in any of these nine capabilities creates a situation in which negative 
consequences could occur.  The next section uses a notional framework of the future 
state of the world to estimate the likelihood and severity of the consequences 
associated with the nine identified capabilities. 
4.3. Future Scenarios 
 Projecting the future security environment is a difficult task.  Today, the 
United States is the preeminent military power in the world, but still faces numerous 
threats.  While the U.S. does not appear to face a threat to its global power in the next 
few years, within decades the circumstances could differ significantly.  Because the 
acquisition process for implementation of new technologies can be long, considering a 
different future is an important exercise. 
 One way to focus thinking for estimating risk in the future is scenario analysis.  
After falling out of favor, scenario analysis is returning as a popular form of risk 
assessment in the corporate world as risk analysts broaden their scope from purely 
financial risks to risks of terrorist attack, loss of company reputation, and supply or 
operations failures (Survey of Risk, 2004:14). 
 In April 1996 a team of Air Force officers produced a report, Alternate Futures for 
2025: Security Planning to Avoid Surprise, suggesting several directions for global 
security.  They developed these scenarios by creating three dimensions of global 
politics.  The first, “American world view,” is a measure of the degree to which the 
United States interacts with the rest of the world and ranges from “domestic” to 
“global”.  The second dimension, “∆TeK”, is a measure of the growth and 
proliferation of technology and ranges from “constrained” to “exponential.”  The 
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third dimension, “world power grid,” is a measure of the dispersion of power and 
ranges from “concentrated” to “dispersed” (Englebrecht, 1996:x).  Combining these 
three dimensions the report team created four visions for the future, focusing on the 
extreme positions of the three dimensions. 
 In order to illustrate the approaches discussed in this thesis, assume subject 
matter experts provide their best estimates of the likelihood of future severities.  The 
following data on future risk are purely notional predictions of the future for each of 
the four scenarios.  For some capabilities, assume the experts provided an overall 
chance of an adverse event happening, and an average or expected severity if an 
adverse event occurs.  For other capabilities, assume the experts provided an overall 
chance of occurrence of an adverse event and two exceedance probabilities: the chance 
that severity will be worse than the modest severity category and the chance that 
severity will be worse than the major severity category. 
 The Gulliver’s Travails vision assumed a global American world view, 
concentrated technology and dispersed global power.  In this future world, the United 
States military struggles with worldwide commitments and diverse operations 
(Englebrecht, 1996:xi).  For the notional example, assume subject matter experts 
assess future risk in the Gulliver’s Travails scenario according to the parameters 
specified in Table 8.  In this scenario surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, command 
& control, communications and force projection are the capability shortfalls with relatively 
high risk. 
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Table 8. Notional Risk Data for Gulliver’s Travails 
Capability shortfall 
Chance of  
adverse event 
Avg severity if 
event occurs 
Prob of severity 
 > modest 
Prob of severity 
 > major 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 0.96 --- 0.740 0.0700 
Intelligence 0.62 3.125 --- --- 
Command & control 0.68 9.375 --- --- 
Communications 0.96 --- 0.560 0.0500 
Force application 0.83 --- 0.580 0.0060 
Force projection 0.56 --- 0.270 0.0080 
Protection 0.08 18.75 --- --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.12 --- 0.090 0.0100 
Force creation 0.02 9.375 --- --- 
 
 In the second vision, Zaibatsu, a domestic American world view combines with 
exponential technology growth and power concentrated in a few multinational 
corporations to form a superficially peaceful world.  The U.S. military struggles to 
remain relevant in this future, where the largest security threat comes from 
instability due to income inequity (Englebrecht, 1996:xii).  For the notional example, 
assume subject matter experts assess future risk in the Zaibatsu scenario according to 
the parameters specified in Table 9.  In this scenario surveillance & reconnaissance, 
intelligence, command & control, communications, protection, preparation & sustainment and 
force creation are the capability shortfalls with relatively high risk. 
 
Table 9. Notional Risk Data for Zaibatsu 
Capability shortfall 
Chance of  
adverse event 
Avg severity if 
event occurs 
Prob of severity 
 > modest 
Prob of severity 
 > major 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 0.40 --- 0.060 0.0080 
Intelligence 0.06 3.125 --- --- 
Command & control 0.09 9.375 --- --- 
Communications 0.24 --- 0.160 0.0060 
Force application 0.05 --- 0.005 0.0002 
Force projection 0.11 --- 0.060 0.0100 
Protection 0.56 9.375 --- --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.50 --- 0.420 0.0200 
Force creation 0.50 3.125 --- --- 
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 In the third vision, Digital Cacophony, America maintains its global interests in 
the face of exponential technological growth and dispersed global power.  The main 
threat faced by the U.S. military in this scenario is advanced weapons of mass 
destruction and cyber attacks (Englebrecht, 1996:xii).  For the notional example, 
assume subject matter experts assess future risk in the Digital Cacophony scenario 
according to the parameters specified in Table 10.  In this scenario force application, 
protection, preparation & sustainment and force creation are the capability shortfalls with 
relatively high risk. 
 
Table 10. Notional Risk Data for Digital Cacophony 
Capability shortfall 
Chance of  
adverse event 
Avg severity if 
event occurs 
Prob of severity 
 > modest 
Prob of severity 
 > major 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 0.59 --- 0.540 0.0500 
Intelligence 0.77 9.375 --- --- 
Command & control 0.60 3.125 --- --- 
Communications 0.87 --- 0.410 0.0500 
Force application 0.76 --- 0.580 0.1100 
Force projection 0.90 --- 0.250 0.0070 
Protection 0.54 3.125 --- --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.66 --- 0.570 0.0070 
Force creation 0.61 9.375 --- --- 
 
 In the final future vision of the world, King Khan, the United States role in the 
world shrinks and a peer competitor in Asia takes over as the primary global power.  
The U.S. military faces drastically reduced budgets and must prioritize which 
capabilities it will keep (Englebrecht, 1996:xii).  For the notional example, assume 
subject matter experts assess future risk in the King Khan scenario according to the 
parameters specified in Table 11.  In this scenario force application and force projection 
are the capability shortfalls with relatively high risk. 
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Table 11. Notional Risk Data for King Khan 
Capability shortfall 
Chance of  
adverse event 
Avg severity if 
event occurs 
Prob of severity 
 > modest 
Prob of severity 
 > major 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 0.20 --- 0.190 0.0400 
Intelligence 0.47 3.125 --- --- 
Command & control 0.35 18.75 --- --- 
Communications 0.04 --- 0.010 0.0020 
Force application 0.45 --- 0.400 0.0100 
Force projection 0.16 --- 0.004 0.0003 
Protection 0.21 3.125 --- --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.26 --- 0.130 0.0200 
Force creation 0.23 18.75 --- --- 
 
4.4. Overall Probability Estimation 
 Overall risk distributions can be built based on the likelihood that any of these 
scenarios is likely to occur.  Using conditional expectation, the likelihood of an 
adverse event can be calculated as the sum of the severity given a scenario, times the 
likelihood of the scenario. 
 P{Severity>0} = P{Severity>0 | Gulliver’s Travails} P{Gulliver’s Travails} 
 + P{Severity>0 | Zaibatsu} P{Zaibatsu} 
 + P{Severity | Digital Cacophony} P{Digital Cacophony} 
 + P{Severity>0 | King Khan} P{King Khan}. (45)
 
 Table 12 shows the combined probabilities and severities assuming each scenario 
is equally likely.  The scenarios do not have to be equally weighted however.  For 
illustrative purposes, assume severity doubles for each categorical step increase, and 
assume catastrophic severity is defined as any severity greater than 100.  For the 
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categorical specifications of expected severity the midpoint of the category interval 
has been used to calculate an average. 
 
Table 12. Combined Quantitative Risk Descriptions 
Capability shortfall 
Event 
likelihood 
Avg if event 
occurs 
Prob of severity 
 > modest 
Prob of severity 
 > major 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 0.54 --- 0.38 0.04 
Intelligence 0.48 4.7 --- --- 
Command & control 0.43 10.2 --- --- 
Communications 0.53 --- 0.29 0.03 
Force application 0.52 --- 0.39 0.03 
Force projection 0.43 --- 0.15 0.01 
Protection 0.35 8.6 --- --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.39 --- 0.30 0.03 
Force creation 0.34 10.2 --- --- 
 
 For risks with likelihood of occurrence and average severity, an exponential 
distribution can be fit.  The risk distribution can be defined as 
 P{Severity > x} ≡ R(x) = (1-p) e-λx (46)
The p parameter is the complement of the probability of occurrence.  The λ parameter 
can be calculated using the specified average severity.  Because this was specified as 
the average if an event occurs, the calculation is made without regard for p. 
 Average severity =  =  ( )∫
∞
0
dxxR ∫
∞ −
0
dxe xλ (47)
 λ = 1 / (Average severity) (48)
 For risks with estimated likelihood of occurrence and two additional probability 
estimates, a Weibull distribution can be fit.  The risk distribution can be defined as  
 P{Severity > x} ≡ R(x) = (1-p) exp(-λβxβ) (49)
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The p parameter is the complement to the probability of occurrence.  The λ and β 
parameters can be calculated by simultaneously solving the other two specified 
probabilities. 
 R(modest) = R(12.5) = (1-p) exp(-λβ12.5β) (50)
 R(major) = R(50) = (1-p) exp(-λβ50β) (51)
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 Table 13 shows the parameters of the fitted distributions and Figure 26 shows 
these risks graphically. 
 
Table 13.  Risk Distribution Parameters 
 p λ β 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 0.4625 0.0345 1.4528 
Intelligence 0.5200 0.1024 --- 
Command & control 0.5700 0.0423 --- 
Communications 0.4725 0.0425 1.1357 
Force application 0.4775 0.0351 1.6393 
Force projection 0.5675 0.0643 0.9800 
Protection 0.6525 0.0404 --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.6150 0.0327 1.7018 
Force creation 0.6600 0.0335 --- 
 
Note that an exponentially distributed risk is equivalent to a Weibull distributed risk 
with a β parameter equal to one. 
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Figure 26. Graphical Depiction of Risks Associated with Nine Capabilities 
 
4.5. Risk Prioritization and Measurement 
 With risk distributions fully specified, risks can be analyzed for prioritization 
and measurement.  The first step is to identify any sets of risks with stochastic 
dominance.  This provides ordinal ranking, but has no associated value.  Risk 
measurement then follows for all nine risks using the distorted expectation risk 
measure. 
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4.5.1. Stochastic Dominance 
 These risks can be analyzed for stochastic dominance by setting the distribution 
functions equal to each other.  If a solution exists to this equation, and the solution is 
not a point of tangency, the distribution functions cross and neither risk dominates 
the other. 
 R1(x) = R2(x) (54)
 ( ) 11111
ββλ xep −−    = ( ) 22221
ββλ xep −−  (55)
 
⎟⎟
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⎞
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−
−
−−
2
1
21 1
1
ln2211
p
p
xx ββββ λλ  = 0 (56)
 In the example, every pair of risks has a solution to this equation with the 
exception of the surveillance & reconnaissance and preparation & sustainment risks, shown 
in Figure 27.  Over the entire severity range, surveillance & reconnaissance has a greater 
probability, so it stochastically dominates preparation & sustainment, and will have a 
larger risk measure regardless of what risk measure is used. 
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Figure 27. Stochastically Ordered Risks 
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4.5.2. Risk Measurement 
 The expected value of the exponential distributed risks is 
λ
p−1
 and the 
expected value of the Weibull distributed risks is ( ) ⎟
⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛Γ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
− βλβ
111 p .  Table 14 shows 
the expected severities of each of the nine risks. 
 
Table 14. Expected Severity Risk Measure 
Risk Expected Severity Priority Order 
Surveillance & reconnaissance 14.1 (1) 
Intelligence 4.7 (9) 
Command & control 10.2 (5) 
Communications 11.8 (3) 
Force application 13.3 (2) 
Force projection 6.8 (8) 
Protection 8.6 (7) 
Preparation & sustainment 10.5 (4) 
Force creation 10.2 (6) 
 
 Under the expected value measure of risk, the surveillance & reconnaissance 
capability has the greatest risk, followed by the force application capability.  The 
intelligence capability has the smallest associated risk.  Again, it is important to note 
that these are all purely notional values. 
 The distorted expectation risk measure can be calculated by 
 Risk Measuredistorted = ( )[ ]( )dxxR∫
∞
−−
0
11 κ  (57)
where larger κ creates larger distortion and corresponds to greater risk aversion, more 
emphasis on the distribution tail.  When κ is one there is no distortion and the 
resulting measure is the undistorted expectation.  Under increasing values of κ, the 
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resulting expectation is the κth order statistic, that is, the expected worst outcome if κ 
samples are taken of the random variable. 
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Figure 28. Distorted Expectation Risk Measure as a Function of Risk Aversion 
 
 Table 15 shows the values of the distorted expectation risk measure for the nine 
risks at three levels of distortion.  With no distortion surveillance & reconnaissance is 
the greatest risk, followed by force application.  Intelligence is the capability with the 
smallest amount of risk.  With some distortion, surveillance & reconnaissance remains 
the greatest risk, but force creation is the second highest.  As distortion increases even 
more, force creation becomes the greatest risk, followed by surveillance & reconnaissance. 
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Table 15. Distorted Expectation Risk Measure 
Risk 
No distortion 
(κ=1) 
Low distortion 
(κ=5) 
High distortion 
(κ=10) 
Surveillance & Reconnaissance 14.1 (1) 38.8 (1) 50.0 (2) 
Intelligence 4.7 (9) 15.2 (9) 21.4 (9) 
Command & Control 10.2 (5) 34.3 (5) 49.3 (3) 
Communications 11.8 (3) 35.5 (4) 48.1 (4) 
Force Application 13.3 (2) 35.9 (3) 45.5 (6) 
Force Projection 6.8 (8) 23.0 (8) 33.1 (8) 
Protection 8.6 (7) 31.1 (7) 46.4 (5) 
Preparation & Sustainment 10.5 (4) 32.5 (6) 43.4 (7) 
Force Creation 10.2 (6) 36.9 (2) 55.3 (1) 
 
 Force creation has the largest ascent in the rankings from zero to high distortion, 
moving from the sixth highest risk to the greatest.  Command & control, moving from 
fifth to third, and protection, moving from seventh to fifth, also display changes in the 
rankings.  Each of these risks has a relatively thick tail in its distribution, so 
increasing the amount of distortion increases these risk measures most significantly. 
 Risks that fall in the rankings as distortion increases include force application, 
from second to sixth, and preparation & sustainment, from fourth to seventh.  These 
risks have relatively thin tails in their distributions, so increasing the amount of 
distortion has a small effect on the risk measure. 
4.6. Potential Systems 
 Ultimately the goal of the CRRA process is to guide future system acquisition.  
Risk measurement can play a role by quantifying the danger of a capability shortfall 
and weighting the importance of closing that gap. 
 This section suggests a notional combination of future systems the Air Force 
might consider.  A limited budget means that every system on the list cannot be 
acquired, so the goal is to determine the optimal mix of systems. 
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 In a December 2003 press release, the Air Force announced six capability 
shortfalls identified by the first iteration of the CRRA process (U.S. Air Force, 2003). 
• Global information grid: The Air Force must create a massive system to collect, 
process, and disseminate information for policy-makers and service personnel. 
 
• Battle space management: The service must create a useful operational picture 
and implement war planning based on combat effects. 
 
• Fleeting and mobile targets: The service must reduce the time to find, track and 
destroy enemy forces. 
 
• Battle damage assessment: The Air Force should build a toolkit and definitions 
for commanders to analyze combat effects. 
 
• Base defense: Roles and responsibilities between the Air Force and the other 
services must be clarified. 
 
• Cargo airlift: The Air Force should begin a formal review of requirements and 
prepare for possible force structure changes. 
 
 Suppose that, based on these shortfalls, the Air Force identifies six systems for 
possible future acquisition.  Note that these are purely notional potential acquisition 
projects. 
• Enhanced globally-accessible intelligence database 
• New heads-up display for fighter aircraft to increase pilot battlespace awareness 
• Standoff missile designed for use against mobile targets 
• Unmanned aerial vehicle with sensors specific for battle damage assessment 
• Detection equipment for chemical, biological and explosive devices at base entry 
points 
• Additional strategic aerial refueling aircraft 
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 It is assumed that the intelligence database provides value in closing the 
shortfall associated with the intelligence, command & control, communications, force 
application, protection, preparation & sustainment and force creation capabilities.  
The fighter aircraft HUD provides value in closing the shortfall associated with the 
surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, command & control, force application, 
force projection and force creation capabilities.  The standoff missile provides value in 
closing the shortfall associated with the command & control, force application and 
force projection capabilities.  The UAV provides value in closing the shortfall 
associated with the surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, communications and 
force application capabilities.  The detection equipment provides value in closing the 
shortfall associated with the surveillance & reconnaissance, intelligence, protection, 
preparation & sustainment, and force creation capabilities.  The refueling aircraft 
provides value in closing the shortfall associated with the force application, force 
projection, preparation & sustainment, and force creation capabilities.   
 Table 16 shows the notional values of each of these potential systems for closing 
the nine capability shortfalls, as well as the notional cost of each system.  Where no 
number is specified, the system is assumed to have negligible impact in closing the 
capability shortfall. 
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Table 16. Notional Reduction in Capability Shortfall by Potential Systems 
Capability Shortfall 
Intel 
database
Fighter 
HUD 
Standoff 
missile 
BDA  
UAV 
Base 
detection Tankers
Surveillance & reconnaissance --- 0.19 --- 0.26 0.26 --- 
Intelligence 0.46 0.21 --- 0.12 0.68 --- 
Command & control 0.34 0.19 --- --- --- 0.23 
Communications 0.14 0.42 --- 0.36 --- 0.05 
Force application 0.10 0.21 0.92 0.30 --- 0.10 
Force projection --- 0.16 0.54 --- --- 0.11 
Protection 0.16 --- --- --- 0.25 --- 
Preparation & sustainment 0.19 --- --- --- 0.31 0.48 
Force creation 0.10 0.05 --- --- 0.33 0.36 
Cost 7 7 10 9 6 9 
 
4.7. Optimization Solution 
 The optimal mix of systems to acquire can be solved using a “knapsack 
problem” in which each potential system is assigned a binary decision variable that 
takes on a value of one if the system is included in the set of systems to be acquired 
and zero if it is excluded.  An objective function to maximize is the sum of the binary 
decision variables, with each variable multiplied by the relative value its system 
provides. 
 Consider the set of nine desired capabilities and the set of six possible systems 
for acquisition.  An objective function of the acquisition problem to be optimized is 
 
Maximize∑ ∑  
= =
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛9
1
6
1i j
jiji xvRM (58)
 
subject to  bxc
j
jj ≤∑
=
6
1
(59)
where 
RMi is the measure of risk associated with capability i, taking into account both 
the probability of occurrence of an adverse event and the distribution of severity 
if an adverse event does occur, i = 1, 2, … 9 
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vij is the value that system j brings to capability i, i = 1, 2, … 9, j = 1, 2, … 6 
xj is a binary decision variable equal to one if system j is to be acquired and zero 
if system j is to be rejected, j = 1, 2, … 6 
cj is the cost of system j 
b is the maximum available budget 
 Because the particular values of the risk measures do not have any meaning 
beyond their relative relationship to each other, the value of the objective function at 
optimality does not have a meaningful interpretation.  Therefore, the usefulness of 
the mathematical program is to identify the optimal mix of systems. 
 Objective function coefficients are the amount of the capability shortfall closed 
by the system in question, adjusted for risk.  The values in Table 16 are multiplied by 
the associated risk measures.  This results in inflated values for capability shortfalls 
with higher risks and deflated values for capability shortfalls with lower risks. 
 Ignoring risk entirely and using a 23-unit budget, the optimal acquisition plan is 
the intelligence database, standoff missile and base detection system.  This leaves no 
slack in the budget.  If the budget is reduced by one to 22, those three systems have 
become too expensive and the missile is exchanged for the HUD in the optimal mix 
of systems.  Under a budget increase there is no change in the optimal system mix 
until the budget reaches 29.  At that level it is possible to acquire four of the six 
systems and the optimal mix includes the intelligence database, HUD, base detection 
equipment and the new tankers. 
 Including risk in the objective function—by using the undistorted expectation 
risk measure—results in an optimal system mix of HUD, standoff missile and base 
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detection equipment.  The HUD is selected instead of the database because it 
provides value to surveillance & reconnaissance, the highest ranked risk in the notional 
example.  The database does not provide any surveillance & reconnaissance value and 
the largest portion of its value is in intelligence, which is the lowest ranked risk. 
 As with the risk-ignored solution, the optimal system mix is more sensitive to 
budget reduction than budget increase.  Reducing the budget by one to 22 changes the 
optimal mix to the HUD, base detection equipment and new tankers.  The budget 
must increase to 29 before the optimal mix changes.  Under that budget the optimal 
mix includes the database, HUD, base detection equipment and new tankers. 
 Increasing risk aversion continues to change the optimal mix of systems to 
acquire.  Under low distortion (κ=5) the result is the same as for the undistorted 
expectation risk measure.  Raising the distortion to κ=10 for a distorted expectation 
risk measure results in an optimal mix of HUD, base detection equipment and new 
tankers.  The tankers provide the most value of any system to force creation, which is 
the highest ranked risk under high distortion. 
 Tightening the budget by two to 21 changes the optimal mix from the tankers to 
the less expensive intelligence database.  Increasing the budget by five to 29 allows for 
an additional system to be acquired, and the optimal mix includes the database, HUD, 
detection equipment and tankers. 
 In this notional analysis, the UAV is not included in the optimal acquisition 
mix in any of these scenarios because of its relatively high cost and low value to the 
nine capabilities.  Under any of the risk measures, including the risk-excluded 
alternative, the UAV cost must fall from nine to three before it will become part of 
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the optimal mix.  Alternatively, the UAV will become part of the optimal mix (using 
the κ=5 distorted expectation risk measure) if its value increases from 0.26 to 0.52 for 
surveillance & reconnaissance, 0.12 to 0.78 for intelligence, 0 to 0.30 for command & 
control, 0.36 to 0.65 for communications, 0.30 to 0.58 for force application, 0 to 0.44 for 
force projection, 0 to 0.33 for protection, 0 to 0.31 for preparation & sustainment, or 0 to 
0.28 for force creation.  If none of these changes to the UAV program parameters are 
realistic, the UAV may be eliminated from discussion to simplify the problem. 
 Table 17 summarizes the results for a 23-unit budget.  The problem formulations 
are included in Appendix C.  The base detection equipment is included in the optimal 
system mix regardless of risk measure and the unmanned aerial vehicle is never 
included in the optimal mix. 
 
Table 17. Optimization Summary Results 
 Risk Measure 
 None 
(risk measure=1) 
Undistorted 
Expectation 
(κ=1) 
Low Distorted 
Expectation 
(κ=5) 
High Distorted 
Expectation 
(κ=10) 
Total cost 23 23 23 22 
Intel database buy --- --- --- 
Fighter HUD --- buy buy buy 
Standoff missile buy buy buy --- 
BDA UAV --- --- --- --- 
Base detection buy buy buy buy 
Tankers --- --- --- buy 
 
 The mathematical optimization program can be made more robust and flexible 
than the example given.  The decision variables could be relaxed, for example, from 
binary variables to any real value between zero and one.  This would allow systems to 
be acquired at less than full capability (Bretschneider, 1993:130).  Alternatively, the 
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decision variables could be allowed to take on integer values greater than one to model 
acquiring multiple copies of a single system. 
 The constraint set can also be developed further, including more than just a 
single budget constraint.  In addition to budget or resource availability constraints, 
integer and linear programming problems often include program balance constraints, 
where the acquisition of one system either requires or does not allow the acquisition 
of another (Bretschneider, 1993:130).  For example, if the HUD and UAV should not 
both be acquired, a constraint 
 HUD + UAV ≤ 1 (60)
prevents both systems from being included in the optimal mix. 
4.8. Illustration Summary 
 This chapter illustrates one possible application of the methodology explained 
in Chapter III.  The illustration considers nine high-level capabilities from the CRRA 
Master Capabilities Library, and four possible scenarios for future security 
environments the U.S. Air Force may find itself facing.  This framework allows 
subject matter experts to make considered judgments about the probability and 
severity of future events.  These judgments can be combined into risk distributions. 
 The most difficult part of risk prioritization and measurement is correctly 
determining the parameters of the risk distribution.  The exponential and Weibull 
distributions offer the advantage of requiring relatively few inputs from subject 
matter experts.  When distributions have been specified, a distorted expectation risk 
measure can be used to summarize each distribution in a single number for ranking 
purposes.  The amount of distortion must be determined by the analyst and decision 
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maker according to the appropriate amount of risk aversion.  The distortion can be 
varied for sensitivity analysis, but should not be adjusted in order to give the “right” 
answer. 
 The most natural use of a risk measure is to rank or prioritize risks.  This 
chapter suggests a further use, as an adjustment to the objective function coefficients 
of a mathematical program to determine the optimal mix of new systems under a 
limited budget.  The greatest risks, with high risk measures, inflate the relative value 
of systems that close capability shortfalls, while the smallest risks, with low risk 
measures shrink the relative value of systems that close those shortfalls. 
 In addition to traditional sensitivity analysis performed on the budget or the 
objective function coefficients, in this methodology the amount of distortion in the 
risk measure can also be adjusted to test for the sensitivity of the optimal acquisition 
mix.  In the notional example, excluding risk from the acquisition decision resulted in 
a different optimal solution from a solution using an undistorted expectation risk 
measure.  High distortion produced a third different optimal solution.  These changes 
in the solution represent optimal decision making at different levels of risk aversion.  
Increasing the level of distortion corresponds to increased risk-aversion, and a greater 
focus on the worst possible outcomes. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Background and Literature Conclusions 
 The study of risk works its way into many disciplines, and the military may be 
able to enhance its own understanding of risk by borrowing from these approaches.  
In the private sector, significant progress has been made toward the analytic goal of 
understanding and quantifying risk.  The growth in information technology, and the 
amount of data collected on, for example, life spans, earthquakes and stock market 
volatility, have allowed for increasingly complex mathematical models for 
understanding and describing risk (Survey of Risk, 2004:4).  Military risk lacks the 
voluminous quantitative data of financial markets and mechanical components.  
Building risk distributions, then, relies heavily on subjective expert forecasts. 
 The general field of decision analysis offers a number of tools relevant to the 
risk ranking problem.  Particularly when very little is known about the underlying 
distributions of risks, and subjective expertise plays a large role, techniques like non-
parametric decision rules and ranking algorithms like the lexicographic or ELECTRE 
methodologies may be valuable.  When possible, however, estimating more complete 
distributions of risk will provide more insight. 
 Engineering approaches to risk focus on breaking complex systems into 
component parts for simpler analysis.  The CRRA master capabilities library will, 
ideally, be an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive Air Force capabilities, broken 
down into simple, measurable sub-capabilities.  This is effectively the 
componentization of the complex system of the United States Air Force.  As the 
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library grows more detailed, estimating risk parameters should become easier, but 
more estimation will be required because of the number of lowest-level capabilities. 
 Financial risk approaches have emphasized the importance of using good 
measures of risk to summarize and rank risk distributions.  The variety of risk 
measures proposed in the literature suggests that there is no single best equation and 
decision makers and analysts must choose a measure appropriate for their particular 
situation and goals (Reesor, 2003). 
 The methodology in this thesis borrows most extensively from actuarial 
science, which may be the field most useful in the study of risk in a military context.  
Insurance firms, with a portfolio of policies, manage multiple risks simultaneously.  
Some of these risks will result in net losses to the firm, while many will never 
involve a claim.  Similarly, the military must prepare to use many different 
capabilities even though a significant number—perhaps a majority—will never be 
employed in combat.  The actuarial collective risk model, which considers claim 
disbursements as a temporal stochastic process, may have application in the 
assessment of risk in military logistics. 
5.2. Methodology Conclusions 
 The first step in modeling risk is the determination and specification of 
severity.  The CRRA has taken significant steps in this process by identifying eight 
factors to consider when estimating severity and defining six qualitative severity 
categories (Appendix A).  This thesis proposes a way to translate these categorical 
severities into an index that can be mathematically manipulated.  Categories express 
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severities in rank order; an index shows the relative differences and the ratio of minor 
severities that are equivalent to catastrophic ones. 
 Displaying risk visually for decision makers can be accomplished with 
probability density functions, showing the likelihood over the range of possible 
outcomes, or complementary distribution functions, indicating the probability of 
severity exceeding some value.  A severity distribution function, S(x), assumes an 
adverse event will occur and is the probability that severity will be greater than x.  A 
risk distribution function, R(x), modifies this severity distribution function to allow 
for the possibility that no adverse event occurs.  In general this risk distribution 
function is the preferred mathematical description of risk and can be shown 
graphically to compare risks as shown in, for example, Figure 26. 
 This thesis proposes using an exponential distribution or Weibull distribution 
to model risk.  These distributions are simple to calculate, requiring relatively little 
subjective input, and in the case of the exponential distribution have the intuitively-
pleasing property that lower severities are more likely than higher severities.  In 
addition, the exponential and Weibull distributions are used in practice in actuarial 
science (Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:78). 
 Many authors have proposed measures of risk to summarize distributions into a 
single number.  This thesis examines four that may be appropriate for measuring 
military risk.  Expectation, the most common risk measure, serves as a baseline for 
the other three measures.  The risk-value measure, combining expectation with 
standard deviation, only requires distribution moments to be known and not the full 
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distribution.  Conditional expectation calculates a risk measure exclusively using the 
worst possible outcomes, focusing the decision maker on the most extreme severities.  
All other things equal, however, the preferred risk measure is distorted expectation, 
using a dual-power distortion measure.  This measure calculates using the entire 
distribution, re-weighting probabilities based on the relative importance of the highest 
possible severities.  The methodology results in a ranking of risks, a measure of risks 
which provides at least some indication of the relative difference between the 
riskiness of the various shortfalls, the ability to vary the measure of risk based on 
decision maker risk aversion. 
5.3. Future Research Opportunities 
 Risk in this thesis only covers negative consequences or severities.  This is in 
accordance with actuarial science and mechanical and environmental engineering risk 
assessment.  The financial literature however, considers risk in both the positive and 
negative directions.  Investment returns can be higher or lower than expected, a factor 
that must be considered in building a portfolio. 
 In the assessment of military capabilities, positive risk may be equivalent to 
redundancy.  The CRRA may benefit from considering not only the capabilities 
where the Air Force suffers from a shortfall, but also those capabilities where a 
surplus exists.  Future study may identify and measure the inefficiencies of this 
“upside” risk. 
 This research proposes the exponential distribution, and the related Weibull 
distribution, as possible models for military risk, primarily because of their simplicity.  
Future study could confirm the usefulness of these distributions or suggest others as 
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more appropriate.  Insurance firms often model claims with a Pareto distribution, for 
example, in addition to their use of the exponential and Weibull distributions 
(Vázquez-Abad and LeQuoc, 2001:78).  The dual-power distortion is recommended 
because of its simplicity and interpretability.  Future research to confirm the 
appropriateness of this distortion, or another more appropriate distortion, would be 
valuable to the military community and the larger risk analysis field (Reesor, 2003). 
 The CRRA has defined severity according to eight factors.  All of the risk 
distributions and measures considered in this thesis require these factors be simplified 
into a single dimension of severity.  A multidimensional risk distribution might more 
precisely describe military risk.  Other risk measurement techniques would be 
required, however.  Alternatively, a study of how to objectively combine severity 
values from all eight factors into a single index would enhance the proposed 
methodology. 
 Risk management is by nature defensive (Survey of Risk, 2004:13).  Enormous 
sums can be spent on an issue that appears potentially harmful.  If nothing negative 
happens, however, it is not necessarily clear if harm was prevented by the expense or 
whether the risk management actions were wasteful.  A study of the past efforts by 
the military to prevent or mitigate perceived risk may provide insight into both the 
assessment of risk and the actions that can be taken to reduce it. 
5.4. Final Recommendations 
 To properly assess risk and include risk as one factor in future Air Force system 
acquisition decisions, probability must be considered part of the analysis.  For some 
capability shortfalls there may be some probability that no severity occurs.  Even if 
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there is certainty that some adverse event will occur if a shortfall exists, the precise 
severity of the outcome probably cannot be determined.  Probability distributions 
allow this range of possibilities to be described mathematically. 
 Risks should be analyzed for stochastic ordering.  When two risk distribution 
functions never cross, they are stochastically ordered, and one risk stochastically 
dominates the other.  This does not necessarily mean that the outcome of the lesser 
risk will always be less than the greater, but the stochastically dominant risk can 
always be considered more risky. 
 When stochastic dominance does not occur, or a quantification of risk is 
required, the distorted expectation risk measure offers a flexible, mathematically 
rigorous way to summarize the risk distribution in a single number.  Unlike some 
other risk measures, it includes the entire distribution in the calculation, and can be 
adjusted to reflect decision maker risk aversion. 
 One of the primary responsibilities of senior leadership—in the corporate world 
or the military—is the management of risk.  Among all the aspects of the future for 
which leadership must prepare, risk is a particular challenge because it involves a 
range of possible outcomes and not an exact target (Survey of Risk, 2004:12).  This 
research offers a rigorous approach for the modeling and measuring of risk associated 
with shortfalls in Air Force capabilities. 
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Appendix A: Severity Categories and Descriptions 
(AFSAA briefing, 2003) 
 Minor Modest Substantial Major Extensive Catastrophic 
Ac
hi
ev
em
en
t o
f O
bj
ec
tiv
es
 
All major objectives 
achieved.  Strong 
initial strategy 
requires few/no 
adjustments.  
Objectives achieved 
on time. 
All major objectives 
achieved.  Strong 
initial strategy 
requires modest 
adjustments.  Few 
operational delays.  
Few delays in 
achieving campaign 
objectives. 
All major objectives 
achieved, but 
strategy adjustments 
required along the 
way.  Some 
operations slowed.  
Achievement of a 
major objective 
delayed. 
One or more major 
objectives in jeopardy 
of not being 
achieved.  Several 
major strategy 
adjustments required. 
Advances toward 
objectives 
slowed/stalled.  
Delayed achievement
of campaign’s major 
objectives. 
One or more major 
objectives not 
achieved.  
Inadequate strategy 
requires many major 
adjustments.  
Advances toward 
objectives stalled.  
Major time pressures 
to achieve objectives 
and end campaign. 
Major objectives not 
achieved.  No 
strategy adjustments 
will allow objectives to 
be achieved.  Time 
pressures force a 
decision to end the 
campaign without 
achieving objectives. 
Fr
ien
dl
y 
Ca
su
alt
ies
 
Few citizens/troops 
killed/ injured.  
Citizens overseas 
threatened. 
Tens of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Citizens 
overseas attacked/ 
injured. 
Hundreds of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Citizens 
overseas attacked/ 
taken hostage. 
Hundreds to 
thousands of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Citizens 
overseas killed/ taken 
hostage. 
Thousands to tens of 
thousands of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Citizens 
overseas killed/ taken 
hostage. 
Hundreds of 
thousands of 
citizens/troops killed/ 
injured.  Many 
citizens overseas 
killed/ taken hostage. 
Fr
ien
dl
y C
ap
ab
ilit
y 
Air/ land/ sea/ space 
control unchallenged. 
No combat losses.  
All mutual support 
requests fulfilled. 
Superiority achieved 
in/ over all areas on 
time; no holdout 
areas.  Enemy 
capabilities do not 
disrupt any missions.  
Almost all requests 
for mutual support 
fulfilled. 
Superiority in/ over 
enemy territory 
delayed; a few 
holdout areas 
avoided.  Enemy 
capabilities disrupt 
some missions.  Most 
requests for mutual 
support fulfilled. 
Superiority in/ over 
enemy territory not 
completely achieved; 
a few areas 
continuously avoided.
A few unanswered 
challenges from 
enemy capabilities.  
Mutual support only 
for high priority 
needs. 
Superiority in/ over 
enemy territory 
limited in area or 
duration; some areas 
avoided.  Some 
unanswered 
challenges from 
enemy capabilities.  
Mutual support very 
limited. 
Superiority limited to 
friendly territory or 
achieved only for 
specific missions; 
significant areas 
avoided.  Major 
unanswered 
challenges from 
enemy capabilities.  
Unable to provide 
mutual support. 
Fr
ien
dl
y 
In
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
No loss of critical 
infrastructure. 
Local/ limited damage
to critical 
infrastructure.  No 
regional damage or 
loss. 
Local damage to 
critical infrastructure.  
No regional damage 
or loss. 
Local damage/ loss 
of critical 
infrastructure.  
Regional 
infrastructure 
affected. 
Some damage to 
friendly centers of 
gravity.  Regional 
damage/ loss of 
critical infrastructure. 
Friendly centers of 
gravity damaged or 
destroyed.  
Widespread 
damage/loss of 
critical infrastructure. 
Co
lla
te
ra
l 
Da
m
ag
e 
Few to dozens killed 
or injured in collateral 
damage.  Local 
damage/ destruction 
to buildings/ 
infrastructure. 
Dozens to hundreds 
killed or injured in 
collateral damage.   
City-wide damage/ 
destruction to 
buildings/ 
infrastructure. 
Hundreds to 
thousands killed or 
injured in collateral 
damage.  Regional 
damage/ destruction 
to buildings/ 
infrastructure. 
Thousands to tens of 
thousands killed or 
injured in collateral 
damage.  Regional 
damage/ destruction 
to buildings/ 
infrastructure. 
Tens of thousands 
killed or injured in 
collateral damage.    
Multi-region damage/ 
destruction to 
buildings/ 
infrastructure. 
Hundreds of 
thousands killed or 
injured in collateral 
damage.  Widespread
damage/ destruction 
to buildings/ 
infrastructure. 
En
em
y E
sc
ala
tio
n 
/ W
MD
 Enemy offensives stopped as they are 
started.  No threats to 
friendly bases.  
Continuous 
monitoring of known 
CBRNE sources. 
Enemy offensives 
stopped in their early 
stages.  Direct, 
credible threats to 
friendly bases.  
Threat of CBRNE 
use/attack possible. 
Enemy offensives 
make some gains 
before being driven 
back.  A friendly base 
attacked and 
damaged.  Credible 
threat of CBRNE 
use/attack.   
Enemy offensives 
make significant 
gains before being 
driven back.  More 
than one friendly 
base attacked.  Some
CBRNE attacks, but 
we have adequate 
detection and 
warning. 
Enemy offensives 
make significant 
gains.   Widespread 
attacks on friendly 
bases.  Some enemy 
use of CBRNE 
weapons.  No 
warning for half the 
attacks; adequate 
warning for half the 
attacks. 
Enemy offensives 
make gains we 
cannot counter.  
Widespread attacks 
on friendly bases.  
Widespread use of 
CBRNE weapons with
no warning for most 
attacks.  Detection 
occurs after attack. 
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 Minor Modest Substantial Major Extensive Catastrophic 
U.
S.
 N
at
io
na
l In
te
gr
ity
 
No enemy  advances 
toward US territory/ 
airspace.  No terror 
attacks/incidents on 
US territory. 
No enemy advances 
toward US territory/ 
airspace.  No terror 
incidents on US 
territory. 
Embassies fired on.  
Conventional enemy 
forces observe US 
territory/ airspace; are
prevented from 
encroaching.  Terror 
attack with 
conventional 
arms/explosives on 
US territory. 
Conflict is non-
nuclear but involves 
terrorism, chemical, 
bio, or radiological 
strikes on US 
territory.  Embassies 
occupied.  
Conventional enemy 
forces encroach upon
US territory/ airspace,
but do not fire on it. 
US survives as a 
nation.  Active conflict
where enemies fire 
on US territory/ 
penetrate US 
airspace.  Single 
nuclear strike on US 
territory.  CBRNE 
incidents. 
National survival 
threatened, loss of 
territorial integrity.  
Long term exhausting 
war.  Entire nation 
focused on resolving 
conflict.  Some 
nuclear strikes on US 
territory.   
U.
S.
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Fu
nc
tio
n 
State or federal first 
responders may go 
on heightened alert.  
No recovery action(s) 
required. 
State government(s) 
executes well 
prepared recovery 
actions.  Federal 
government 
assistance not 
needed. 
State government 
falters occasionally in 
executing recovery 
plans.  Federal 
government 
assistance 
necessary. 
Attack recovery is 
difficult.  Federal 
government focuses 
on it above all else.  
State government 
focuses on it above 
all else.  Federal 
government 
assistance required 
for response. 
Federal and state 
governments struggle 
to cope with attack(s).
Losing war would 
mean ideological and 
cultural realignment.   
Survival of a 
functioning 
government is 
threatened.  Losing 
war would mean 
ceding sovereignty or 
occupation. 
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Appendix B: Master Capabilities Library 
(AFSAA, 2004) 
1. Surveillance & Reconnaissance. The capability to successfully conduct surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions to satisfy Commanders’ Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). 
1.1. Surveillance. The capability to systematically and continuously observe aerospace, 
surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, 
photographic or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
1.1.1. Conduct maritime surface/terrestrial surveillance 
1.1.2. Conduct maritime subsurface/subterranean surveillance 
1.1.3. Conduct air surveillance 
1.1.4. Conduct space surveillance 
1.1.5. Conduct environmental surveillance 
1.1.6. Conduct information surveillance 
1.2. Reconnaissance. The capability to conduct transitory missions to obtain by visual 
observation or other detection methods, specific information about the activities and 
resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the 
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (AFDD 
2-5.2) 
1.2.1. Conduct maritime surface/terrestrial reconnaissance 
1.2.2. Conduct maritime subsurface/subterranean reconnaissance 
1.2.3. Conduct air reconnaissance 
1.2.4. Conduct space reconnaissance 
1.2.5. Conduct environmental reconnaissance 
1.2.6. Conduct information reconnaissance 
2. Intelligence. An integrated capability to provide accurate, timely information and thereby 
achieve the Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA) required to plan and conduct operations. 
(AFDD 2-5.2) It is the capability to develop information and knowledge as the result of 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas (e.g. geographic, technological, etc.). (Joint 
Pub 2-01.) General Categories of intelligence include Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and Signature 
Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). 
2.1. Processing and Exploitation. The capability to exploit and convert raw data info forms of 
information that can be readily used by intelligence and environmental analysts/experts.  
Processing and exploitation tasks include initial interpretation, data conversion and 
correlation, document translation, and decryption, as well as providing the processed 
information to follow-on phases of analysis. 
2.1.1. Interpret and convert IMINT data 
2.1.2. Decrypt and correlate SIGINT data 
2.1.3. Translate and correlate HUMINT data 
2.1.4. Conduct data conversion and correlate MASINT data 
2.1.5. Interpret and correlate OSINT data 
2.1.6. Process Mapping and Geodesy data 
2.1.7. Process and build a coherent picture of the natural environment 
2.2. Analysis and Production. The capability to integrate, analyze, evaluate, interpret and 
fuse processed information to create intelligence and environmental products in the 
appropriate media that will satisfy the PIRs, other user requirements, or Battlespace 
Awareness. Information becomes intelligence and environmental impacts knowledge at 
the conclusion of this phase. 
2.2.1. Produce Indications and Warning (I&W) 
2.2.2. Produce Current Intelligence 
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2.2.3. Produce Targeting Intelligence 
2.2.4. Produce General Military Intelligence 
2.2.5. Produce Scientific/Technical Intelligence 
2.2.6. Produce current and predicted environmental impacts knowledge 
2.3. Dissemination and Integration. The capability to format and disseminate intelligence 
and environmental products to the requestor/consumer.  The intelligence cycle is 
complete when the requestor/consumer integrates the intelligence into decision making 
and planning processes. 
2.3.1. Provide Indications and Warning (I&W) 
2.3.2. Provide Current Intelligence 
2.3.3. Provide Targeting Intelligence, to include Battle Effects Assessments 
2.3.4. Provide General Military Intelligence 
2.3.5. Provide Scientific/Technical Intelligence 
2.3.6. Provide Precise Mapping and Geodesy Information 
2.3.7. Disseminate and integrate environmental impacts knowledge 
2.4. Predictive Battlespace Awareness. The capability to correlate and fuse patterns of enemy 
activity and subsequent events to predict adversary intent and/or potential future enemy 
courses of action.  PBA is used to enable effects based planning, execution and 
assessment of an operation or operations in a theater.  Fusing all sources of 
data/intelligence to produce intelligence assessments inside the enemy’s decision loop. 
Providing this information to commanders in time to protect friendly forces from enemy 
attack or to maximize the element of surprise. 
3. Command & Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command 
and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-
02 April 2001) Operations requiring C2 include Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Intelligence, 
Communication, Force Application, Force Projection, Protection, and Preparation & 
Sustainment. 
3.1. Monitor. The reception, monitoring, maintenance, integration, and display of 
information on global actions, critical events, and crisis areas, to include the status of 
friendly and non-friendly forces, rules of engagement (ROE), treaties, agreements, and 
physical environmental conditions. 
3.1.1. Receive information from all sources 
3.1.2. Monitor information from all sources 
3.1.3. Maintain information from all sources 
3.1.4. Integrate information from all sources 
3.1.5. Display information from all sources 
3.2. Assess. Determine the nature and impact of conditions and events to include the military 
implications of intelligence indicators, environmental effects, and orders of battle. 
Implies ability to develop total situational awareness, evaluate threats and opportunities 
and to provide early warning and attack assessment to: 
3.2.1. Determine and assess the nature and impact of critical events in the battlespace 
3.2.2. Assess status of resources 
3.2.3. Assess implications of fused, all source intelligence assessment combined with 
current and predicted environmental impacts knowledge 
3.2.4. Assess events relative to rules of engagement (ROE), treaties and agreements 
3.2.5. Assess termination options, conditions, proposals 
3.3. Plan. Formulate the operational objectives, generate force lists, and force movement 
requirements and develop, evaluate, and select courses of action and plans for friendly 
forces. 
3.3.1. Formulate Military Objectives 
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3.3.2. Develop potential COAs/Plans 
3.3.3. Evaluate COAs/Plans 
3.3.4. Select COA/Plan 
3.3.5. Merge Generate and tailor force list and force Movement requirements 
3.3.6. Develop Joint Air Operation Plan (JAOP), ISR Collection plans, Air Control 
Order, Area Air Defense Plan, Air & Space Tasking Order, and other directives 
and orders as required. 
3.3.7. Coordinate planning with multi-agency partners, including military, national, 
civil, and commercial organizations 
3.3.8. Plan Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) Operations 
3.4. Execution Authority. Conduct dynamic battle management and control, and adjust 
operations as circumstances change. 
3.4.1. Disseminate information 
3.4.2. Convey execution authority for COA/plan 
3.4.3. Retask based on effects based operation assessment 
3.4.4. Interoperate with multi-agency partners, including military, national, civil, and 
commercial organizations 
3.4.5. Execute Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) Operations 
3.5. Position, Navigation, Timing 
3.5.1. Provide position 
3.5.2. Provide navigation 
3.5.3. Provide timing 
4. Communications. The ability to represent transfer, compute, and assure data among persons 
and machines. 
4.1. Transport Information. Send voice, data, imagery, or video from one location and receive 
it at another location(s). 
4.1.1. Provide information transport to and from any location on the globe via space, air, 
terrestrial or subsurface means. 
4.1.2. Prioritized Information Delivery. Based upon commander’s quality of service 
requirements and users’ needs. 
4.2. Computing and Enterprise Services. Input, store, retrieve, process, display, access, 
discover, and output information. 
4.2.1. Store. Retain data in any form, usually for the purpose of orderly retrieval and 
documentation. 
4.2.2. Retrieve. Find and bring back requested data 
4.2.3. Process. Operate on data with software applications for a specified purpose. 
4.2.4. Display. Present information for use by a person. 
4.2.5. Discover. 
4.3. Assure. Protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. 
4.3.1. Information. 
4.3.2. Information Systems. 
4.4. Manage and Control Network Resources and Network Systems. 
4.4.1. Network Management. Provision network resources to meet capacity 
requirements of the network’s users and connected devices. 
4.4.2. Network Damage Assessment/Reconstitution. Automatic or manual methods to 
detect/assess damage or degradation and return a network to service. 
5. Force Application. Capability to survive and engage a variety of targets throughout the 
battlespace by kinetic (nuclear and non-nuclear) and non-kinetic means. 
5.1. Survive and operate against air, space, surface, subsurface, maritime, information, and 
asymmetric/unconventional threats 
5.1.1. Gain awareness of threat prior to entering enemy detection envelope 
5.1.2. Deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy (D5) the enemy F2T2E kill chain 
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5.1.3. If unsuccessful, mitigate/negate effects of engagement by threat 
5.2. Neutralize Threats/Targets – The actions necessary to engage a threat or target 
assuming F2T2 are complete. 
5.2.1. Transit to a weapons employment zone (WEZ) – Move to a position from which 
a weapon may be delivered against the threat or target. 
5.2.2. Deliver weapons – The primary capabilities-based threat/target classes are fixed 
and moving/movable. Further subclasses include the full spectrum of target types 
located in all environments subsurface, surface, air, suborbit, space, and the 
infosphere. In these environments, weapons must achieve desired effects 
including conventional, nuclear, non-kinetic, counter- CBRNE/Low-
observable/HDBT, informational, psychological, permanent, or temporary. 
5.2.3. Support weapons as required from target designation through release until fuzing 
or effective – update threat/target track as required during flyout of weapons to 
ensure precise effects 
5.3. Recover Personnel and Materiel - the capability to locate, authenticate, and recover 
downed combatants and materiel in enemy (Combat Search and Rescue), neutral, and 
friendly environments 
5.3.1. Report 
5.3.2. Locate 
5.3.3. Support 
5.3.4. Recover 
6. Force Projection. The ability to project and extend national power (military and non-military) 
around the globe in a timely manner. 
6.1. Rapid Global Delivery. The timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military 
forces and capabilities through air and space, across the range of military operations. 
6.1.1. Airlift. Worldwide transportation of personnel and materiel through the air which 
can be applied across the entire range of military operations 
6.1.2. Spacelift. The delivery of satellites, payloads and materiel to or through space. 
Includes the capabilities of routine or on-demand launch and on-orbit 
repositioning of space-based assets. 
6.1.3. Sealift. Worldwide transportation of personnel and materiel via sea mode of 
transportation which can be applied across the entire range of military operations 
6.1.4. Surface Lift. Worldwide transportation of personnel and materiel via ground 
mode of transportation which can be applied across the entire range of military 
operations 
6.2. Extend Air and Space Operations. The ability to increase range, loiter time, cargo load, 
payload and orbit life of air and space assets 
6.2.1. Air Refueling: Provide the in-flight transfer of fuel between tanker and receiver 
aircraft for the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment for all 
refuelable U.S. and coalition aircraft (includes fixed and rotary wing aircraft) 
6.2.2. Provide on-orbit servicing: Support the inspection, repair, replacement, and/or 
upgrade of spacecraft subsystem components and replenish spacecraft 
consumables (fuels, fluids, cryogens, etc.) by another vehicle. 
7. Protect. The integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that detect, assess, 
predict, warn, deny, respond, and recover, preempt, mitigate, or negate from threats against or 
hazards to air and space operations, critical infrastructure, and assets, and personnel based on an 
acceptable level of risk. Includes Full Spectrum Threat Response to all threats, including 
humanitarian and civilian, major accidents, natural disasters, and use of unconventional 
(including WMD) or conventional weapons. 
7.1. Detect. The ability to detect threats to friendly resources (personnel, physical assets, or 
information). 
7.1.1. Sense CBRNE Threats at Point and Stand-off Distances 
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7.1.2. Detect Health Threats: Ability to detect the effects of select nonweaponized 
(naturally occurring) physical, biological and chemical threats on personnel and in 
the environment. Ability to establish baseline levels of naturally occurring agents 
and health assessments of personnel and to identify increases from the baseline. 
7.1.3. Detect Conventional and Unconventional Threats. Detect the full range of threats 
to Air Force operations, assets, and personnel including surveillance, conventional 
capabilities, and asymmetric capabilities. 
7.1.4. Detect Information Operations Threats 
7.2. Assess and Predict. Accurately assess adversary capabilities to be used against friendly 
personnel, physical assets, or information and precisely derive adversary courses of 
action planned or employed with the intent to destroy or disrupt operational readiness. 
Track threat and friendly location in order to predict future actions. 
7.2.1. Assess and predict friendly vulnerabilities. Conduct assessments and predictive 
analysis to identify and predict vulnerabilities. 
7.2.2. Predict threat COAs against friendly resources (personnel, physical assets, or 
information). Conduct predictive analysis of possible enemy COAs for the 
purpose of effective planning and mitigation. 
7.2.3. Assess identified threats. Provide positive identification of threat and assessment 
of overall capability of the threat. 
7.2.4. Track identified threats. Provide decision makers and responders with track/path 
of threat. 
7.2.5. Assess friendly COAs. Conduct assessment of friendly capabilities in order to 
effectively plan and mitigate potential enemy COAs. 
7.2.6. Track friendly forces. Provide decision makers and responders with track of 
friendly forces. 
7.3. Warn. Disseminate threat information in a timely, accurate, and unambiguous manner. 
7.3.1. Provide military decision-makers with recommended courses of action. Provide 
threat working group recommendation to decision makers, from base commander 
to higher headquarters in a timely, accurate, and unambiguous manner. 
7.3.2. Provide civil authorities warning of threat and recommended courses of action. 
Provide an effective, timely means to communicate with civil authorities. May 
require foreign disclosure authority. 
7.3.3. Provide military/installation populace advanced warning of threat. Provide 
commander’s channel, public affairs, giant voice, email and other means to warn 
of threat. 
7.3.4. Provide civil populace advanced warning of threat. Provide public affairs, email 
and other means to warn of threat. Off base may require foreign disclosure 
authority. 
7.4. Deny and Respond. Includes Full Spectrum Threat Response. Support and offensively 
and defensively resist threats directed against friendly personnel, physical assets, or 
information in order to preserve operational readiness by both active and passive means. 
Includes Full Spectrum Threat Response to all threats, including humanitarian and 
civilian, major accidents, natural disasters, hazardous materiel incidents, and use of 
unconventional (including WMD) or conventional weapons. Respond through pre-
emptive, immediate, and sustained actions. 
7.4.1. Deny Conventional or Unconventional Threats 
7.4.2. Respond. Provide law enforcement and security, fire protection, EOD/WMD, 
medical response, by lethal and/or non-lethal means, to the full spectrum of 
emergencies, threats, hostile acts/events. 
7.4.3. Provide Assistance to Civil Authorities: Includes Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities (MACA) in the US and overseas. 
7.4.4. Provide Defensive Information Operations. The protection of critical information 
systems and infrastructure. Capabiltities that prevent paralysis of critical 
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infrastructure and prevent unauthorized or harmful activities on AF information 
systems. 
7.4.5. Provide Defensive Counterspace. Protect and prevent against Space 
Threats/Targets and environment – the capability to perform defensive 
counterspace operations in order to distinguish between attacks and anomalies, 
withstand and defend systems from attack, and reconstitute and repair space 
capabilities. (Note: The counter space functions of space surveillance/space 
situation awareness are under Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Command and 
Control, Communications master capabilities.) 
7.5. Recover. The threat is defeated and recovery actions begin. (Residual threats may still be 
present). These capabilities include medical treatment and support, damage repair, 
cleanup actions, and actions to transition back to normal peacetime operations. 
7.5.1. Recovery Operations 
7.5.2. Medical treatment—restore health 
7.5.3. Mortuary Operations 
8. Prepare and Sustain. Activities required to establish operating locations, generate the mission, 
support and sustain the mission, and posture responsive forces. 
8.1. Open & Establish Operating Locations. Assess, plan, reconfigure, modify, build, and use 
a supportable infrastructure (industrial, administrative, medical, living) to support the 
mission, personnel and equipment at specific locations from which operations are 
projected or supported. This includes expeditionary as well as in-garrison operating 
locations. 
8.1.1. Provide operating location assessments. Collect and assess operational and support 
infrastructure and security data, and plan for the support of operations from the 
selected location. Includes: Collect - Collect pertinent pre-deployment data on-
location and/or remotely; Survey – Confirm the validity and accuracy of collected 
data; Assess - Analyze location capability and operational support requirements; 
and Plan – Plan base lay out and security requirements. 
8.1.2. Establish runways, taxiways, ramps, roads, security perimeters, and building sites. 
Utilize, initiate, build, and modify surface and vertical structures required to bring 
a base’s airfield operating and support infrastructure to a functional condition or 
preparatory state to accomplish the assigned mission. 
8.1.3. Establish utility grid. Utilize, initiate, install, and modify power (electrical), 
water, and wastewater infrastructure to a predetermined operational state. 
8.1.4. Establish communications grid. Utilize, initiate, install, and modify a 
telecommunications network to a predetermined operational state. 
8.1.5. Establish fuel grid. Utilize, initiate, install, and modify a fuel storage and 
distribution network of tanks, pipelines, and access points for aviation petroleum, 
oils, lubricant, and propellant requirements to a predetermined operational state. 
8.1.6. Establish facilities. Utilize, initiate, construct, modify, and assemble temporary or 
permanent structure and infrastructure to a predetermined operational state. 
8.2. Generate the Mission. Prepare and generate mission elements and payloads; initiate or 
launch air, space, SOF, information, and HUMRO missions; recover mission elements; 
and regenerate mission capability repetitively for the full range of mission operations. 
8.2.1. Prepare and generate the mission element. repair, configure and inspect, and 
provide to operations to accomplish the assigned mission. 
8.2.2. Configure mission element. Set up for specific mission (configure and load 
payload) 
8.2.3. Support initiation/launch of mission element. Handoff to operator 
8.2.4. Recover mission element. Receive and assess status of mission element 
8.2.5. Prepare payload. configure for specific mission need (assemble payload, deliver for 
loading) 
B-6 
 
8.2.6. Prepare and configure launch and recovery apparatus. Repair, restore, and 
configure apparatus used for support of mission element initiation, launch, or 
recovery 
8.2.7. Fuel mission element. Direct contact with mission element to provide POL and 
other propellants required for mission element initiation/launch. 
8.3. Support and Sustain the Mission and Forces. “Support” directly assists, maintains, 
supplies, and distributes forces at the operating location to achieve the mission and 
maintain the operation of its infrastructure. “Sustain” maintains effective capacities of 
mission support for the duration of operations worldwide and distributes materiel when 
the executive agent role falls to Air Force. 
8.3.1. Assist mission, forces, and infrastructure. Assure operation of the operating 
location as a platform for mission elements. (control flightline and airspace traffic, 
billet forces, medically treat forces, enhance human performance, pay forces, feed 
forces, minister to forces, administer UCMJ, PERSCO, contract management, 
agreements, etc.) 
8.3.2. Maintain support of mission, forces, and infrastructure. Assure operating 
capability through repair and preservation of equipment, vehicles, runways, 
taxiways, ramps, roads and building sites, utility, communications, and fuels 
grids, facilities, and other infrastructure used in support of mission. 
8.3.3. Supply support for mission, forces, and infrastructure. Receive, store, and issue all 
commodities needed to service and maintain the mission equipment, munitions, 
support equipment, vehicles, facilities and infrastructure, personnel, medical, 
service and administrative functions, and communications. 
8.3.4. Distribution support for mission, forces, and infrastructure. Transport and deliver 
personnel, equipment, and commodities to user in processes of mission and 
support operations. Maintain effective capacities of mission support for the 
duration of operations worldwide. Reachback repair and resupply Major End 
Items and components. Provide purchasing and Supply Chain Management, Air 
Force Specialty (AFS) Functional Management, strategic and operational levels of 
distribution (in those instances where executive agent role falls to Air Force) and 
create and maintain Total Asset Visibility. 
8.4. Posture Responsive Forces. Define, present, apportion, and process force capabilities, 
including execution of agreements and prepositioning strategy, to maximize 
responsiveness and speed of employment. 
8.4.1. Define force capabilities. Define common operating and support pictures for 
global, theater, and operating location current and future operating environments. 
8.4.2. Structure force capabilities. Organize and right-size forces to create specified 
effects as required by the combatant commander. (e.g. UTCs and force modules 
such as Open the Base, Establish the Base, etc.) 
8.4.3. Apportion force capabilities. Assess and allocate force capabilities needed to meet 
the National Security Strategy objectives of the regional combatant commanders. 
8.4.4. Process force capabilities. Form, load, move, receive, and account for the 
personnel, materiel, and equipment that constitute a capability. 
8.4.5. Execute Support Arrangements. Negotiate and put in place interservice, coalition, 
and/or contract arrangements to assure responsive support. 
8.4.6. Execute Prepositioning Strategy. Assess, plan, and place prescribed levels of 
resources and capabilities at strategic locations to meet required National Security 
Strategy objectives. 
9. Create the Force. Organize, train, and equip the combat and support capabilities of the Total 
Force to meet global combatant commander requirements. Maintain sufficient capacities of 
created forces. 
9.1. Organize Forces 
9.1.1. Model, simulate, test, evaluate, and assess responsive forces. 
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9.1.2. Simulate force capabilities to ensure they are fully integrated into training, 
wargames, experiments, exercises, and operations 
9.1.3. Define requirements for and establish responsive forces 
9.1.4. Define requirements for and establish responsive organizations capable of 
integration with operations, joint, coalition and inter-agency organizations 
9.2. Train. Prepare mission-ready graduates capable of providing the best available 
specialized expertise to the combatant commander 
9.2.1. Conduct Flying Training 
9.2.2. Conduct Technical Training 
9.3. Educate. Develop airmen, over the span of their career, by integrating enduring 
leadership competencies and analytical skills 
9.3.1. Provide Accessions Education 
9.3.2. Provide Professional Military Education 
9.3.3. Provide Specialized/Professional Continuing Education 
9.3.4. Provide Degree Granting Educational Programs 
9.3.5. Provide Citizenship Education 
9.3.6. Provide Research and Consultation Programs 
9.4. Equip 
9.4.1. Design, develop, acquire, and modernize force elements; includes equipment, 
systems and personnel 
9.4.2. Ensure and maintain, through a combination USAF/DOD agencies, industry and 
academia, a viable industrial base capable of research, testing, manufacturing, 
dismantlement, and remanufacturing to produce, sustain and modernize forces 
9.4.3. Assure the reliability and technological superiority of materiel, equipment, and 
information 
9.4.4. Assure and validate weapon system, equipment, item, materiel and IT capability 
across system life cycles through operational test and evaluation of operational 
availability and performance requirements 
9.5. Recruit and Access. Seek, select, and enter quality people into active duty according to 
Air Force mission requirements 
9.5.1. Access Enlisted Personnel 
9.5.2. Access Officers 
9.5.3. Access Health Professions and Chaplains 
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Appendix C: Linear Program Formulations 
 
Potential systems for acquisition. 
• Intelligence database (x1) 
• Fighter heads-up display (x2) 
• Standoff missile (x3) 
• Stealthy battle damage assessment unmanned aerial vehicle (x4) 
• Chemical weapon detection equipment (x5) 
• Tankers (x6) 
 
Linear program formulation with no risk measure included. 
Maximize 
  (0   +0.46+0.34+0.14+0.10+0   +0.16+0.19+0.10) x1
+ (0.19+0.21+0.19+0.42+0.21+0.16+0   +0   +0.05) x2
+ (0   +0   +0   +0   +0.92+0.54+0   +0   +0   ) x3
+ (0.26+0.12+0   +0.36+0.30+0   +0   +0   +0   ) x4
+ (0.26+0.68+0   +0   +0   +0   +0.25+0.31+0.33) x5
+ (0   +0   +0.23+0.05+0.10+0.11+0   +0.48+0.36) x6
Subject to: 
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23 
All decision variables binary 
 
 
Linear program formulation with undistorted expectation risk measure. 
Maximize 
  (0        +4.7*0.46+10.2*0.34+11.8*0.14+13.3*0.10+0       +8.6*0.16+10.5*0.19+10.2*0.10) x1
+ (14.1*0.19+4.7*0.21+10.2*0.19+11.8*0.42+13.3*0.21+6.8*0.16+0       +0        +10.2*0.05) x2
+ (0        +0       +0        +0        +13.3*0.92+6.8*0.54+0       +0        +0        ) x3
+ (14.1*0.26+4.7*0.12+0        +11.8*0.36+13.3*0.30+0       +0       +0        +0        ) x4
+ (14.1*0.26+4.7*0.68+0        +0        +0        +0       +8.6*0.25+10.5*0.31+10.2*0.33) x5
+ (0        +0       +10.2*0.23+11.8*0.05+13.3*0.10+6.8*0.11+0       +10.5*0.48+10.2*0.36) x6
Subject to: 
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23 
All decision variables binary 
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Linear program formulation with low distortion (κ=5) expectation risk measure. 
Maximize 
  (0        +15.2*0.46+34.3*0.34+35.5*0.14+35.9*0.10+0        +31.1*0.16+32.5*0.19+36.9*0.10) x1
+ (38.8*0.19+15.2*0.21+34.3*0.19+35.5*0.42+35.9*0.21+23.0*0.16+0        +0        +36.9*0.05) x2
+ (0        +0        +0        +0        +35.9*0.92+23.0*0.54+0        +0        +0        ) x3
+ (38.8*0.26+15.2*0.12+0        +35.5*0.36+35.9*0.30+0        +0        +0        +0        ) x4
+ (38.8*0.26+15.2*0.68+0        +0        +0        +0        +31.1*0.25+32.5*0.31+36.9*0.33) x5
+ (0        +0        +35.5*0.23+35.5*0.05+35.9*0.10+23.0*0.11+0        +32.5*0.48+36.9*0.36) x6
Subject to: 
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23 
All decision variables binary 
 
 
Linear program formulation with high distortion (κ=10) expectation risk measure 
Maximize 
  (0        +21.4*0.46+49.3*0.34+48.1*0.14+45.5*0.10+0        +46.4*0.16+43.4*0.19+55.3*0.10) x1
+ (50.0*0.19+21.4*0.21+49.3*0.19+48.1*0.42+45.5*0.21+33.1*0.16+0        +0        +55.3*0.05) x2
+ (0        +0        +0        +0        +45.5*0.92+33.1*0.54+0        +0        +0        ) x3
+ (50.0*0.26+21.4*0.12+0        +48.1*0.36+45.5*0.30+0        +0        +0        +0        ) x4
+ (50.0*0.26+21.4*0.68+0        +0        +0        +0        +46.4*0.25+43.4*0.31+55.3*0.33) x5
+ (0        +0        +48.1*0.23+48.1*0.05+45.5*0.10+33.1*0.11+0        +43.4*0.48+55.3*0.36) x6
Subject to: 
7x1+7x2+10x3+9x4+6x5+9x6 ≤ 23 
All decision variables binary 
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